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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Tax Court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Final Order and Judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0.*
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 (plenary authority in county executive to settle "all
lawsuits and other actions")
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 ("trial de novo" in the Tax Court)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 (county legislative body vested with power to refund
erroneously collected taxes upon sufficient evidence produced)
Utah Const, art. XIII § 6(4)(legislative authorization for tax courts to determine
"any matter" decided by the Tax Commission)
Utah Const, art. XIII § 7(2)(county boards vested with power to "adjust and
equalize" assessments)

1

The Tax Commission invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Court Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), which vests the Supreme Court with jurisdiction over final orders of
"the State Tax Commission." This is plainly incorrect because none of the parties before
the Tax Commission in the 1995-1996 valuation case and the 1997-1999 valuation case
appealed to the Supreme Court, although they could have filed such an appeal. Instead,
the parties petitioned for a review by "trial do novo" in the Tax Court, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §59-1-601.
604432.2
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant") believes the issues on appeal, and the
appropriate "standards of review" are more properly framed as stated below, rather than
as referenced in the Briefs of Appellants Lee Gardner and Granite School District, and
the Brief of Appellee Utah State Tax Commission.
ISSUE NO. 1
Was the Tax Court correct in upholding and enforcing a Settlement Agreement3
voluntarily consummated in good faith between the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization (the "Board") and Alliant, and which the Salt Lake County Commission, as
the County's duly constituted legislative and executive body ratified, adopted and
approved, to settle protracted litigation over property tax disputes for the years 1995
through 1999 inclusive?

Although the Tax Commission and Alliant are both designated as
"Defendants/Appellees," perhaps implying some mutuality of interest, the Tax
Commission was an aggressive adverse party to Alliant in the Tax Court, so much so that
Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis warned the Tax Commission, "A contestation of the
facts by the Tax Commission may cross the line into an advocacy role, may suggest
partiality of the State Tax Commission, and would hopelessly weaken or destroy its
jurisdictional arguments based upon an exhaustion of administrative remedies' theory."
Tax Court Ruling dated September 7, 2001 at 6; R. 001954, 001949, Appendix G.
3

A copy of the Settlement Agreement, dated December 5, 2000, is attached as
Appendix A. A copy of the Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions and Judgment, from
which the Assessor and Granite filed this appeal, dated June 30, 2003, is attached as
Appendix B. A copy of the Tax Court's Decision dated September 20, 2001 is attached
as Appendix C.
(LCviAll

0

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The standard of review for Issue No. 1 is whether there is "substantial evidence"
to support the Tax Court's undisputed findings of fact that the Settlement Agreement was
achieved in good faith, because the law vesting authority in the County Executive to
settle "all lawsuits and other actions" was statutorily, and therefore conclusively, resolved
in Alliant's favor on December 6, 2000 when the Salt Lake County Commission
ratified/approved the Settlement Agreement. A brief explanation for this statement is
necessary since Appellants have completely mischaracterized the underlying issues on
appeal as legal, rather than factual. Appellants' mischaracterization is so egregious the
Court may be perplexed as to whether the parties are discussing the same case.
Appellants' mischaracterization results from either disregard or ignorance of the
controlling Utah statute that vests the County Executive with authority to settle litigation.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(l)(a)(2001), formerly Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-24,
provides, "the county executive may control and direct the prosecution, defense, and
settlement of all lawsuits and other actions." (Emphasis added.)

This statute is

unambiguous and was in effect when the Salt Lake County Commission adopted and
approved the Settlement Agreement appellants challenge.

Therefore, the only

conceivable theoretical circumstances where this statute would not control are: (1) if the
statute is unconstitutional; or (2) the County Executive (in this case the Salt Lake County
Commission) acted outside the scope of delegated authority given the facts and
circumstances of this case.

604432.2
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Under established case law, Appellants' view on either a constitutional challenge
to Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 or the County Executive's potentially alleged ultra vires
actions, whatever they may theoretically be, are now "off the table," because neither
Appellant4 even cites this controlling statute, much less mounts a challenge to its
constitutionality or enforceability. Appellants cannot do so in a reply brief. See, e.g.,
Romrell v. Zions First Nafl Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980) (as a general rule, an issue
raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal). Neither does the Tax
Commission's "Brief of Defendant/Appellee" cite Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315.
Oblivious to the existence of the very statute controlling the outcome of this case, the Tax
Commission "asks this Court to establish a procedure for use by the Tax Commission and
the district courts to determine whether a property tax settlement involving multiple years
satisfies the constitutional standard of taxation 'at a uniform and equal rate in proportion
to its fair market value.'" Tax Comm'n Brief at 8. Given its desire to have this Court
establish procedure, the Tax Commission should at least have identified what it believes
is deficient with the procedure the legislature established in Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315
to settle "all lawsuits and other actions." Inexplicably, the Tax Commission's brief does
not raise this question. Neither does it argue whether Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 must

4

The Board, which "attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language" of the
Settlement Agreement, [Findings of Fact f 21; R. 002874, Appendix B] is here
designated as a "Defendant/Appellee," and chose not to file a brief. The Board is an
awkward dilemma. On the one hand, the Board advocated rejection of its own Settlement
Agreement once the County form of government changed from a Commission to a
Council. On the other hand, if the Board succeeds in its apparent desire to invalidate the
Settlement Agreement, it will have necessarily undermined its statutorily vested authority
as the "County Executive" to settle "all lawsuits and other actions."

be construed to exclude property tax litigation to its otherwise explicit coverage for "all
lawsuits and other actions." Instead, the Tax Commission asks this Court to "establish a
procedure" for settling property tax litigation, which is indisputably the legislature's
prerogative.

At a minimum, the Tax Commission and Appellants should have

acknowledged Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 in their respective briefs, including all
arguments, from their viewpoints, why this statute is impotent to settle "all lawsuits and
other actions," including property tax litigation, when the very language of the statute
confers such settlement authority as its express purpose.
Appellants' failure even to cite the controlling statute undermines a rational
discussion of the issues, and renders the fundamental underpinnings of their arguments
simply beside the point, off-target and superfluous. As referenced above, Appellants may
not attack the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 for the first time in a reply
brief. It should further be noted that the Tax Commission, as a Defendant/Appellee, is
not entitled to file a reply brief.
Given the undisputed statutory authority of the County Executive to settle "all
lawsuits and other actions," Appellants' primary legal issue (i.e., whether the County
Executive is vested with plenary authority to settle litigation) and the primary policy
issue (i.e., whether the County Executive ought to have such authority despite the Tax
Commission's preference for having this Court, rather than the legislature, "establish
[settlement] procedures") have been conclusively resolved in favor of the Settlement
Agreement. Thus, the "ball game is over." Unless words are ignored or parsed, "all
lawsuits and other actions" obviously means and must include this litigation. The only

604432.2
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remaining conceivable basis for challenging the Settlement Agreement in this case,
therefore, turns on the facts—whether the Settlement Agreement is unenforceable or void
because of, inter alia, fraud, undue influence, mistake, or other such factors that could be
a basis for invalidating any contract. See generally 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and
Settlement §§ 39-46, at 754-759 (2000).
Here, Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis' specific findings of fact are conclusive:
'There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties to the
Settlement Agreement^]' Findings of Fact f 22, R. 002874, Appendix B; "There is no
evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement based
upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, injustice,
overreaching, or against sound public policy[,]" Findings of Fact f 23, R. 002874,
Appendix B; "The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good
faith..." Findings of Fact \ 36, R. 00287, Appendix B; and, 'The intent of the parties to
settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995 through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal."
Findings of Fact, f 37, R. 002871, Appendix B.
This Court reviews findings of fact under a "substantial evidence" standard, which
means the trial court's factual findings will be upheld if they "are supported by
substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole." See, e.g., Zissi v. State Tax
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). "Substantial evidence" is "that quantum and
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion." Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 987 P.2d 594, 597
(Utah 1999).

For an appellant to prevail under a "substantial evidence" standard, the appellant
must "marshal the evidence," which means "one challenging the verdict must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict [or trial court findings] and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." See, e.g.,
Neeley v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724, 726 (Utah App. 2002); Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc.
29 P.3d 629, n. 8 (Utah 2001) (dismissing Morgan County's argument that Holnam's
purchases of machinery and equipment were not made in the ordinary course of business
because the County failed to marshal the evidence to the contrary); Young v. Young,
1999 UT 38,115, 979 P.2d 338 (The challenging party "must marshal the evidence in
support of the [trial court's] findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous."); Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 24,
973 P.2d 431 (the court of appeals does not review the trial court's factual findings where
the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the evidence. Instead, the court of
appeals must "assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court").
Though the Tax Commission is here designated as a "Defendant/Appellee," it
nonetheless carries the same burden of marshaling the evidence against the presumptive
application of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(1) because it strenuously argued against the
validity of the Settlement Agreement before the Tax Court. See, e.g., Tax Comm'n's
Reply Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Approve Settlement, R. 001826. The Tax
Commission was and indisputably is "one challenging the verdict."

604432.2
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Neither Appellants, nor the Tax Commission, attempt to meet their burden of
marshaling the evidence. None of the opposing briefs discusses the evidence supporting
the Tax Court's finding, for instance, that the Assessor was a party to the Settlement
Agreement. Nor do the opposing parties demonstrate why the evidence the Tax Court
relied upon is not substantial. Having failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Tax
Court's findings, and having further failed to demonstrate why such evidence is
insubstantial, Appellants' primary argument—that the Settlement Agreement is invalid
and/or does not bind the Assessor — must likewise fail.
ISSUE NO. 2
Did the Tax Court have jurisdiction to enter its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Final Order and Judgment that the Settlement Agreement is legal, constitutional
and enforceable against the parties in the litigation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Subject matter jurisdiction presents issues of law, to which this Court applies a
correction of error standard. See, e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)
("questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are
reversed only if clearly erroneous.")-

Although jurisdiction is a question of law, the

facts and circumstances supporting the Tax Court's exercise of jurisdiction are issues of
fact. This Court applies a substantial evidence standard in deference to the Tax Court's
findings, unless there is no evidence to support them. See, e.g., Neeley v. Bennett, 51
P.3d 724, 726 (Utah App. 2002). Neither the Assessor nor Granite has marshaled the
evidence, which convinced the Tax Court to conclude it had jurisdiction, nor have
/CA/MIO 1

8

Appellants shown why the evidence the Tax Court considered, though overwhelming, is
nonetheless from Appellants' perspective, insubstantial. Having failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the Tax Court's findings, and then failed again to demonstrate why
such evidence is insubstantial, the Assessor's and Granite's assertions that the Tax Court
lacked jurisdiction must also fail.
ISSUE NO. 3
Was the Tax Court correct in finding Salt Lake County Assessor Lee Gardner was
covered by the Settlement Agreement and bound to uphold its terms?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Determining the parties to and the fulfillment of the Settlement Agreement (a
contract), including its breach, is a matter fact, not a matter of law, as the Assessor
contends. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sunrider Corp. 48 P.2d 913, 924 (Utah 2002) ("if the
contract is not an integration or is ambiguous [because it is disputed who and who is not
bound] and the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions of the parties
based on extrinsic evidence [as in this case], then our review is strictly limited.")
(emphasis added). This Court reviews findings of fact under a "substantial evidence"
standard, recognizing Appellants' obligation to "marshal the evidence," as explained
above.
The Assessor's brief makes no attempt whatsoever to meet these burdens. The
Assessor's brief fails to marshal the evidence supporting the Tax Court's finding that the
Assessor was a party to the Settlement Agreement, nor does the Assessor show why the
evidence the Tax Court relied upon is not substantial. Having failed to marshal evidence
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supporting the Tax Court's findings, and having failed again to demonstrate why such
evidence is insubstantial, the Assessor's arguments, that the Settlement Agreement is
invalid and/or the Assessor is not bound by the Settlement Agreement, must necessarily
fail Here again, it is too late for the Assessor to attempt to marshal the evidence in a
reply brief. See, e.g., Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053, 1062
(Utah 2002)("[The] eleventh-hour attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence in the reply brief is too late.").
STATEMENT OF CASE
On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff Alliant Techsystems Inc., and the Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization entered into a written stipulation and settlement agreement
(the "Settlement Agreement") to refund $5 million to Alliant in complete settlement and
satisfaction of all pending and contested litigation over the property tax assessments and
valuations of Alliant's taxable, tangible real and personal property in Salt Lake County
for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive. At a duly called and constituted public
hearing on the matter convened December 6, 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission
heard testimony from all parties favoring and disfavoring the Settlement Agreement,
specifically including Appellants Lee Gardner and the Granite School District. The Salt
Lake County Commission discussed and evaluated that testimony, and then unanimously
ratified/approved the Settlement Agreement. On December 15, 2000, Salt Lake County
and Alliant filed a Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of
an Order Approving Settlement ("Joint Motion") with the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, as a
Tax Court Judge, and with the Utah State Tax Commission.

*•r\

A

*<\f\ r%

ill

All parties, including AUiant, the County, the Assessor Lee Gardner, the Utah
State Tax Commission, and Granite School District subsequently filed memoranda
contending for their respective positions on the Joint Motion. On March 13, 2001, the
Court heard oral argument on the Joint Motion.
Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the respective parties,
and the Court being fully advised of the premises, the Court entered a written "Tax Court
Decision" dated September 20, 2001, [R. 001987, Appendix C] which held the
Settlement Agreement was legal, enforceable and constitutional, but could not be
implemented by the Court because, at the time, jurisdiction over the five years covered by
the settlement was divided between the Tax Court (tax years 1995 and 1996) and the Tax
Commission (tax years 1997, 1998 and 1999). Lacking jurisdiction over some of the
years being settled, the Court declared it "has no option but to reluctantly disapprove the
Settlement Agreement." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001, R. 001963,
Appendix C.
Following the Tax Court's decision, the Tax Commission heard and rendered its
decision on the valuation of AUiant's properties in Salt Lake County for tax years 1997,
1998 and 1999. Both AUiant and the Board sought review of the Tax Commission's
ruling in a "trial de novo" before the Tax Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601.
Once jurisdiction over all property tax litigation for each of the years 1995 through 1999
(years included in the Settlement Agreement) was vested in the Tax Court, AUiant
requested that the Tax Court reconsider its prior "reluctant" disapproval of the Settlement
Agreement. Following another round of extensive memoranda from all parties, and re-
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argument, the Tax Court entered its "Ruling Respecting the Legal Effect of Bluth v. Utah
State Tax Commission on this Court's Decisions" on May 20, 2003, reaffirming several
prior rulings that it had jurisdiction [R. 0028954, Appendix E].5 Thereafter, the Tax
Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order and Judgment on
June 20, 2003 (the "Judgment") [R. 002881-002865, Appendix B] finding the Settlement
Agreement was "legal, enforceable and constitutional" against all parties. It is from the
Tax Court's Judgment that Defendants-Intervenors Assessor Lee Gardner and Granite
School District took the present appeal.
Tax Court's Findings of Fact
The Tax Court's Findings of Fact as specified in the Judgment are critical to the
proper disposition of this appeal and so are reproduced in their entirety for the Court's
easy reference.6
1.

On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's

Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.
5

As referenced in the Tax Court's Findings/Conclusions, the Settlement Agreement
includes two groups of valuation cases, one for 1995-1996, and another for 1997-1999,
and an independent action Alliant filed against the County challenging imposition of a
privilege tax against Alliant for its use of federal property. In its May 20, 2003 Ruling,
the Tax Court held that this Court's ruling in Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT
91, and Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, which require exhaustion of
administrative remedies, did not apply to the "independent action." The Tax Court held it
would be "completely senseless, indeed impossible" to require exhaustion of the federal
1983-constitutional issue in NIROP when the Tax Commission has no jurisdiction to
decide it." R. 002848, Appendix E. The Tax Court's decision on various dispositive
motions in the independent action for the years 2000 and thereafter, which the parties
reargued on April 20, 2004, is expected anytime.
6

The Tax Court's citations to the Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001, R.
001987, Appendix C, are deleted for ease of reading.
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2.

The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through

April 27, 2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the
years 1997 through 1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for
Alliant's property was $215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997
through 1999 respectively.
3.

On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the

Third District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601
of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsystems v. Board of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, et al, Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 9&-0608 and 99-019.

These

consolidated cases protest the County's assessments of Alliant's real property for the
years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "1997-1999 Valuation Case").

Under regular

administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case was designated Case No.
010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as a Tax Court
Judge.
4.

Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute

Entry dated October 9, 2001.
5.

The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B.

Brian, sitting as a Tax Court Judge.
6.

Filed simultaneously with its Petition for [R]eview in the 1997-1999

Valuation Case was Alliant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn
W. Davis, a designated "Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District
Courts.
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7.

Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this [the

District] Court. No less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties
and taxes are pending before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake
County cases was filed February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis
Frederick (980901298). This first case was termed the "Independent or NIROP Action,"
and involves Alliant's statutory and constitutional challenge to the County's assessment
of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction and control of the United
States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or "NIROP"). The Complaint
in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against
defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and future years.
The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having
taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States Constitution.
8.

There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or

NIROP Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable
Lynn W. Davis.
9.

The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et al, cases are appeals

that either Salt Lake County or Alliant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals
of the County's 1995 and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "19951996 Valuation Case"). The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the
various appeals of the 1995-1996 Valuation Case respectively to Judges Nehring
(990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis (00901301), Medley (000901449 AA), and
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Memmott (00070001). Again with agreement from all parties, the 1995-1996 Valuation
Case was consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable Lynn W. Davis because he was
the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the Independent or NIROP Action.
10.

By Order dated November 6, 2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the

19974999 Valuation Case to this [the District] Court.
11.

On December 5, 2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and

Alliant entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between
the parties for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On
December 6, 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly elected
legislative body, adopted and approved the Settlement Agreement.
12.

On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and

Voluntary Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax
Commission, dismissing all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission
with respect to personal property tax assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive.
13.

As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this

[the District] Court are all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt
Lake County relating to property tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive;
to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 19971999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax matters have been dismissed.
14.

Parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement while some

matters covered by the Settlement Agreement, specifically property tax disputes
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involving Alliant and some of the Defendants, were pending before this Tax Court and
the Tax Commission.
15.

The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the Tax

Commission and this Court.
16.

Prior to the formalization and approval of the Settlement Agreement, a draft

or proposal was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as
parties to the action. While the Settlement Agreement deletes the word "Assessors," as
approved and executed, it states that Salt Lake County, and its "officers" are parties to the
Settlement Agreement.
17.

The executed Settlement Agreement bears the signature of Karl

Hendrickson, Deputy District Attorney for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, its officers
and attorneys, and the signature of Maxwell Miller for and on behalf of Alliant. The
Settlement Agreement was an offer of settlement presented by the attorneys/agents of the
parties to the Settlement Agreement.
18.

Defendant Lee Gardner, as the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor, is

an officer of Salt Lake County and a nominal party to the Settlement Agreement.
19.

The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in extending and

agreeing to the Settlement Agreement were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County
Commission.
20.

In reaching settlement, consideration was given to the risk of liability to

Salt Lake County and taxing entities within Salt Lake County, together with the costs and

trouble of protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some
discussion relative to the merits of the respective claims.
21.

The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Salt Lake County, which later

attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language based upon statutory,
constitutional and pragmatic arguments.
22.

There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the

parties to the Settlement Agreement.
23.

There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered

into the agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity,
disadvantage, injustice, overreaching,, or against sound public policy.
24.

This Settlement Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County

Board of Equalization and then was adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County
Commission.
25.

The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations

based upon fair market value.
26.

The Settlement Agreement does not address the divisibility/severabihty of

the $5 million settlement amount to separate years. The Settlement Agreement spans
multiple tax years and multiple jurisdictions.
27.

The Settlement Agreement binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and

attorneys," who, "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" shall "seek to secure
an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission
approving the settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner."
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28.

The Settlement Agreement further provides that "In the event any party

breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching party is entitled to
attorney's fees or costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement."
29.

The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization did not affirmatively seek to

secure approval of the Settlement Agreement, nor did it object to approval of the
Settlement Agreement; instead it acted in "benign neutrality" with re&pect to the approval
process.
30.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his role of Salt Lake County Assessor,

advocated the defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invited the Court to void the
agreement on a variety of statutory, factual and constitutional grounds, which the Court
rejected.
31.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is a

party to the Settlement Agreement because he is, at least nominally, an "officer" of Salt
Lake County.
32.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor,

breached the Settlement Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather
than seeking to secure its approval.
33.

Other Defendants who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement are not

bound by the attorneys' fee provision of the Settlement Agreement.
34.

While the Settlement Agreement is a blanket settlement for all property tax

disputes between the parties for 1995 through 1999 either pending before this Court or
before the Tax Commission, the Settlement Agreement did not address future valuations.
18

35.

The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the

County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the
United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The
Complaint in the independent or NIROP actions seeks declaratory and injunctive relief
against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and
further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States
Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 1995-1999, clearly
including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover future years
(beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued unlawful
assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of the NIROP claims are expressly covered
by the Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted, never
addressed in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar postsettlement NIROP claims.

The NIROP claims are separate from the other related

valuation cases.
36.

The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good faith

and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant.
37.

The intent of the parties to settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995

through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal.
38.

The Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement did not focus

on constitutional difficulties
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and problematic implementation of the Settlement
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Agreement, but primarily upon the Settlement Agreement's failure to include a potential
intervenor.
39.

The Tax Commission's factual basis for rejecting the Settlement

Agreement does not exist here because an intervenor does not become a party to an
action until the motion to intervene has been filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled
upon. Defendant Granite School District filed its Motion to Intervene on December 7,
2000, whereas the Salt Lake County Commission ratified the Settlement Agreement on
December 6, 2000.
40.

Alliant's request for attorneys' fees is reasonable and appropriate in the

amount of $30,000.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On December 5, 2000, the Board and Alliant entered into a Settlement Agreement
whereby Salt Lake County agreed to refund $5 million to Alliant in settlement of all
pending property tax litigation and disputes involving real and personal property for tax
years 1995 through 1999 inclusive. Significantly, on December 6, 2000 in a public
hearing, the Salt Lake County Commission, as the governing executive and legislative
body of Salt Lake County, considered, ratified, adopted and approved the Settlement
Agreement for the stated purpose of settling the protracted property tax litigation and
disputes between the parties for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive. The Tax Court,
after considering the basis for and the facts and circumstances surrounding the Settlement
Agreement, ruled that the Settlement Agreement was "legal, enforceable and
constitutional" because the governing executive and legislative body of a county can
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always negotiate and settle litigation that it deems to be in the county's best interests.
The Tax Court's holding is consistent with and supported by Utah Code Ann. § 17-53315, which vests authority with the County Executive to settle "all lawsuits and other
actions," certainly including property tax Utigation. The Tax Court's holding is further
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601, which vests the Tax Court with appeal
authority to consider and reverse the Tax Commission's disapproval of the Settlement
Agreement in an "original," and "independent" action, brought as a "trial de novo."7
Though neither Appellants nor the Tax Commission cite to these statutes, both are
important in promoting and upholding the settlement of disputes that county officials
achieve in good faith. Public policy favors the good faith and equitable settlement of
disputes between contesting parties in the absence of fraud, overreaching or impropriety.
This is particularly true in property tax litigation where settlements are common, if not
routine, as members of the Salt Lake County Commission recognized in uncontested
statements Commission members made on the record when approving the Settlement
Agreement on December 6, 2000. R. 001687, 001685.

In view of all the facts,

considerations, competing interests and risks to the parties, including the risks, costs and
expenses associated with continuing protracted litigation, Alliant and Salt Lake County
determined the settlement amount of $5 million, in good faith, to be fair and reasonable
under the circumstances. On this basis, the Tax Court examined, approved and upheld
the Settlement Agreement, noting that "As a general rule, a court ought not to substitute

7

For the Court's convenience, a copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-53-315 and 59-1-601 are
reproduced in Appendix D, complete with annotations and legislative history.
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its judgment for that of duly elected officials." Tax Court Decision dated September 20,
2001, R. 001972. On the same basis, this Court should uphold the Tax Court below and
sustain the Settlement Agreement.
ARGUMENT
L

AS FOUND BY THE TAX COURT, THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS
LEGAL, ENFORCEABLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL TO RESOLVE AND
SETTLE PROTRACTED LITIGATION INVOLVING ALL PROPERTY
TAX DISPUTES BETWEEN SALT LAKE COUNTY AND ALLIANT FOR
THE YEARS 1995 THROUGH 1999 INCLUSIVE.
Both the Assessor and Granite argue against approval of the Settlement

Agreement because each claims (1) the Settlement Agreement does not necessarily
mandate that Alliant's property is being valued and taxed at its fair market value under
Utah Code Ann. §§59-2-301 and 59-2-102 for each of the years in dispute; and
(2) parties affected have the right to intervene in appeals taken from the Board of
Equalization.

Assessor's Brief at 18-19; Granite's Brief at 15.

Although these

statements may be correct, neither has any bearing upon the Salt Lake County
Commission's authority to settle litigated disputes in the County's best interests.
Statutorily, the Assessor has a duty to assess property at fair market value, as
numerous cites in his brief identify. However, that duty is not unique to the Assessor.
The Board likewise has a duty to ensure that property is assessed at fair market value
under the Utah Constitution and statutory law. Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1); Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-103(1). Significantly, and in opposition to the logical extension of the
Assessor's arguments, there is no statutory or constitutional authority that the Assessor's
view on what constitutes fair market value should prevail over the Board's determination.
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In fact, just the opposite is true because the Board has supervisory authority over the
Assessor with express power to affirm, reverse or modify the Assessor's original
assessments. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-1002, 59-2-1003.
Moreover, achieving "fair market value" is constitutionally subordinate to the
Board's duty to equalize assessments so that all taxpayers, including Alliant, are treated
equitably and fairly. See, e.g., Harmer v. State Tax Comm'n, 452 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah
1969) ("While absolute equality and uniformity in the assessment of property is not
practicable, a requirement of reasonable uniformity and equality is essential."); Rio
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 194 (Utah 1984) ("Where it is
impossible to achieve perfectly both the standard of true value and the standard of
uniformity and equality, the latter standard should prevail.").
As a result, neither the Assessor nor Granite has veto power over the Board's
decision to settle disputed litigation, which is consonant with its power to equalize values
so that taxpayers are fairly and equitably assessed. Neither can such authority be derived
from the Assessor's right to appeal the Board's adjudication of fair market value, nor the
Assessor's and/or Granite's right to intervene in this proceeding. If the Assessor and/or
Granite's assertions are correct, settlement and mediation of property tax cases is illegal
and unconstitutional—a radical and absurd result given the long history of property tax
dispute mediation and settlement in this state and elsewhere.
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A.

The Board's authority to settle tax disputes is founded upon the Utah
Constitution, Utah statutes, and public policy favoring settlements.

Pursuant to Utah Const, art. XIII, § 7(2), Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1000 et seq. and
Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315, the Board and the County Commission have plenary
authority to settle cases. Article XIII authorizes the Board to "adjust and equalize the
valuation and assessment of real and personal property within their respective counties."
Sections 59-2-1000 et seq. vests the Board with authority to perform administrative and
ministerial acts necessary to adjust and equalize assessments. Section 17-53-315 vests
the County Executive (in this case the Salt Lake County Commission) with express
authority to settle litigation and other actions.

Under Utah case law and general

principles of administrative law, the Board's adjustment and equalization authority and
the County Commission's plenary authority to settle litigation also includes the
prerogative to evaluate litigation risks and likely costs, and to choose or compromise
between conflicting appraisals, as the Board and the County Commission did in this case.
There are supporting Utah cases directly on point. In Logan City v. Allen, 44 P.2d
1085 (Utah 1935), the Utah Supreme Court upheld what was then designated as the
Board of County Commissioners' decision to lower and settle a property tax dispute over
the objections of another government entity. In Logan City, plaintiff Logan City sought
personal judgment against the county board and the Tax Commission for having
compromised and reduced the assessed property tax liability on the William Budge
Memorial Hospital in Cache County. Under the laws then extant, this Court found that
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the county board and the Tax Commission had authority, as a matter of discretion, to
compromise the amount of tax, interest, penalty and costs assessed against the hospital
property. Said the Court: "This being a matter within their discretion, it follows the
individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for a mistake in exercising such
judgment, if it be a mistake, in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or collusion." Id. at 1089.
Responding to Logan City's allegations of bad faith in the settlement, the Court
pointed out the Tax Commission had concluded the charitable status of the hospital
"involved a controversial question which could be definitely settled only by the courts.
To avoid expense and delay incident to further litigation, the commission approved the
acceptance of the offer of the hospital to pay [reduced taxes]/' The Court continued
"[w]hether or not the tax commissioners were correct in their analysis of this court's
[prior] decision [relating to the hospital's charitable character] or in reaching the
conclusion they did is of no moment here.

It is apparent to us the board of

commissioners and the State Tax Commission acted in the utmost good faith, and in the
belief the settlement effected was for the best interest of the state, county, and the city."
Id. at 1089. Notably, the Court cited no constitutional restraint against the county board
effecting a compromise and settlement of the tax liability, regardless of the property's
assessed value.
The statutes at issue in Logan City and the nature of the action are different than
those involved here. The important point is that the Utah Constitution is virtually
8

In Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 1984 Utah Lexis 951 (Utah 1984), this Court cites
Logan City v. Allen for the proposition that "A discretionary duty is one that requires the
exercise of judgment or requires choice of alternatives in its performance." Id. at 65.
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identical in all material aspects. The proposition for which Alliant cites Logan City, that
there is no constitutional impediment against the compromise and settlement of property
tax cases, is therefore applicable and unassailable under any reasonable analysis.
The holding in Logan City is consonant with the Utah Supreme Court's more
recent decisions affirming settlement agreements on public policy grounds, both in
administrative and judicial cases. For example, in Millard County v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[a]s a
general proposition, §§59-12-204(5) and 59-12-118 authorize the Commission to
determine the amount of a taxpayer's sales tax liability and, in appropriate cases, to
compromise and settle disputes with taxpayers." (Emphasis added.) The same general
policy applies to other administrative bodies.

See also Utah Department of

Administrative Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 856 P.2d 601, 613-14 (Utah 1983)
(stating that the agency is "not an automaton" and has the authority, under general
principles, to settle controversies if it determines settlement is in the public interest).
The Supreme Court's preference for compromise and settlement of controversies
reflects the general principle that "[p]ublic policy favors the resolution of controversies
and uncertainties through compromise and settlement rather than through litigation, and it
is the policy of the law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made and
not in contravention of some law or public policy." 15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and
Settlement § 5 (2000).
The Assessor claims Logan City is inapplicable because the Utah statutes there
involved were dissimilar (a point conceded), while he simultaneously ignores the more
96

important principle for which Logan City is cited - that the Utah Constitution does not
preclude property tax settlements. The Assessor missed the point. Again shooting wide
of the mark, the Assessor argues "the general rule" that governmental bodies, such as a
Board of Equalization, cannot lawfully contract to control or limit the performance of
governmental functions by successor government bodies.

Cited in support of this

proposition are Bair v. Layton City Corp., 307 P.2d &95, 902 (1957), and 10A McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, § 29,101 at 44 (3d Rev. Ed. 1993). Assessor's Brief at 34-35.
The issue in Layton City Corp. was whether a contract between Layton City,
North Davis County Sewer District and various individuals to construct and operate
adequate facilities for the disposal and treatment of sewage collected in the district was
lawful under various provisions of the Utah Constitution. The contract was to take effect
from the date of its execution and to continue in force for fifty years. This Court held
that a contract involving the government's exercise of its proprietary functions (including
the provision of water, electricity and sewer systems) is binding on successors, but a
contract cannot lawfully bind a government in the exercise of "governmental or
legislative power."
Layton City Corp. and the other authorities the Assessor cites, including City of
Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981), stand for the
undisputed proposition that contracts cannot bind governments in the performance of
their future governmental functions, such as contracts that would preclude passage of
certain laws or issuance of assessments. Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement in this
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case could not lawfully bind the Assessor in prospective years to any particular
methodology in the performance of his duties.
However, breaching contracts made in settlement of litigation for past acts is not a
governmental function. Nor does the settlement of past controversies bind any successor
government to future actions.

Hence, none of the authorities the Assessor cited is

relevant or even speaks to the issue at hand, which is: May a government entity
unilaterally repudiate a contract properly entered into by duly constituted authorities in
settlement of litigation?
The Settlement Agreement explicitly disavows any intent to bind the Board or any
County officer in the performance of any future government function. It has no impact
on the future performance of any government duties, but instead, resolves litigation over
assessments that have already been issued and upon which Alliant has already paid its
taxes.
Before the Tax Commission and the Tax Court, Alliant's counsel repeatedly
challenged opposing counsel to find a single case in American Jurisprudence that holds a
government entity may repudiate its own good faith agreement in settlement of litigation
for past, as distinguished from future, acts. No one has been forthcoming with any such
case despite the passage of years, and the challenge still stands.
Consistent with the foregoing case law, county boards of equalization routinely
settle property tax disputes (presumably totaling hundreds annually) without challenge to
their authority and ability to do so. The minutes of the Salt Lake County Commission
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meeting held December 6, 2000 to consider the Settlement Agreement in this case
confirm this history and its acknowledged legality:
Commissioner Overson asked Mr. Robson [Granite's
counsel] if he had heard of the settlement cases involving
Hercules [1994 assessment], U.S. West and Kennecott. There
have been large tax settlements of a similar nature over the
past eight years that he [Overson] has been involved with that
the school districts have not raised a question about. These
settlements impacted school districts, but there was no loss in
teacher, books and supplies. It [sic] some cases, not all of the
issues were clarified. Many issues were left on the table and
not settled.
Minutes, County Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000); R. 001687.
B.

The Salt Lake County Commission, as the county legislative and
executive body, has plenary authority to settle litigation in the best
interests of the County.

Both the Assessor and Granite argue the Settlement Agreement cannot be
sustained because there is no express statutory authority allowing the Board to settle such
disputes. Assessor's Brief at 31-32; Granite's Brief at 19-20. These arguments cannot be
taken seriously in light of express authority conferred in Utah Code Ann. § 17-53315(l)(a). Appellants' arguments ignore explicit statutes vesting the County Board with
plenary authority to equalize and adjust assessments, and the County Executive with
plenary authority to settle litigation, as cited above. In this case, the Salt Lake County
Commission on December 6, 2000 ratified/approved of the Settlement Agreement prior
to its implementation by the parties. Findings of Fact f 19, 24; R. 002874, Appendix B.
The Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's then legally constituted governing
legislative and executive body, chose to settle Alliant's litigation against the County
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because it believed settlement was in the County's best interests.

In approving the

Settlement Agreement, the Salt Lake County Commission considered the risk of liability
to the County and its taxing entities based upon a review of depositions and appraisals,
and some discussion of the relative merits of the respective parties' claims. Findings of
Fact 120; R. 002874, Appendix B.

The County Commission's

settlement

ratification/approval came after an open public meeting, at which all interested parties
expressed their positions and concerns, specifically including both the Assessor and
Granite. R. 001684. In light of this public record, portions of which are quoted below,
the Assessor's insistence that he was excluded from deliberations (Assessor's Brief at 43)
is incredulous.
Utah Code Ann.§ 17-53-3159 expressly empowers the County Executive to
control, prosecute, defend and settle all lawsuits and other actions to which the county is
a party or as to which the county may be required to pay a judgment. Prior to institution
of the Mayor-Council form of government by Salt Lake County on January 1, 2001, the
Salt Lake County Commission that considered and approved the Settlement Agreement
served as both the legislative and executive branch of government statutorily empowered
with plenary authority to settle lawsuits.

The Settlement Agreement is necessarily,

therefore, a County agreement, as well as a Board of Equalization agreement.

The

County Commission then had the rights and plenary powers of a County legislative and
9

Effective as of April 30, 2001, Utah Code Ann.§ 17-53-315 reads, in pertinent part: "A
county executive may control the prosecution, defense, and settlement of all lawsuits and
other actions: (i) to which the county is a party; (ii) as to which the county may be
required to pay the judgment or the costs of prosecution or defense; or (iii) as further
provided by county ordinance."
HC\AA1^
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executive body, whose legislatively vested authority expressly included the power to bind
the County, its officers and attorneys. As the Tax Court noted in the Tax Court Decision
dated September 20, 2001, "The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County Commission; (This fact alone may cast
this case in a different posture than some case law cited as controlling.)" R. 001973,
Appendix C.
In adopting the Settlement Agreement, the Salt Lake County Commission was
obviously concerned with Alliant's property values, fairness to County taxpayers and the
risks of continuing litigation. The minutes of the December 6, 2000 public meeting
reflect these realities, confirm the grounds for ratifying/approving the Settlement
Agreement, and demonstrate why the Commission believed the settlement was in the
County's best interests:
Commissioner Overson stated that the Commission is looking
at both ends of the spectrum. The County will either win or
lose. There is a big difference between the two relative to the
amount that will have to be paid by either party. This weighs
heavily on the minds of the Commissioners ... He [Overson],
himself, is a state certified general appraiser. He does not
currently appraise property because it would be a conflict of
interest with his role as a Commissioner. However, as he
reviewed the expert witness calculations, who came up with
zero obsolence [sic] in one year and very, very little
economical obsolence [sic] in a number of other years. This
really bothered him. It concerned him that there was no
economical [sic] obsolescence considering the the [sic} size,
nature and complexity of a facility like Alliant Techsystems.
Although he didn't particularly agree with Alliant
Techsystems position as to the amount of obsolescence they
acclaim [sic], he wholly rejected the idea that there is zero
economic obsolescence in the Alliant Techsystem's
facility....This is the reason he reviewed Mr. Cook's
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appraisal. As a member of the Board of Equalization, he
knows that there is something somewhere in the middle with
regard to economic obsolescence.... This is the reason for
settling the matter somewhere in the middle.... He believed
that the taxpayers should be justly treated[;]their valuations
should reflect the actual value of their properties. He cannot,
with a clear conscience, accept that Alliant Techsystem's
value on the particular property went from $110 million in
1994 to $200 million plus in 1999-2000.
Minutes of County Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000), R. 001685.
Commissioner Shurtleff stated ... he tried to step back and
look at the case as a judge or jury would. He believed there
was a substantial likelihood that the County would not prevail
in this case. If so, there will be an $11 million hit on the
taxpayers, and a substantially larger hit on Granite School
District.
He felt there [sic] would be inappropriately
unreasonable and risky to continue litigating this matter....
By settling this case, the Commission will be resolving a fiveyear dispute and avoid having to pay an $11 million
settlement later.
Id. R. 001684.
Neither of the Appellants (Salt Lake County Assessor, Granite School District) nor
the Tax Commission challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315, nor
do they cite the statute, nor do they analyze or discuss it in any way. In fact, neither
Appellants nor the Tax Commission evince any awareness of this controlling statute's
existence, which necessarily renders many of their respective arguments invalid and
superfluous as total non sequiturs.

We are not told why Appellants and the Tax

Commission are oblivious to this controlling statute, but whatever the reason, it is too late
in a reply brief for appellants to attack the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53315 for the first time. See, e.g., Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah
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1980) (as a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be considered on
appeal).
Given the undisputed statutory authority of the County Executive to settle "all
lawsuits and other actions/' the primary legal issue in this case (i.e., whether the County
Executive is vested with plenary authority to settle litigation) and the primary public
policy issue in this case (i.e., whether the County Executive ought to have such authority
despite objections of other entities within the County) have been conclusively resolved in
favor of the Settlement Agreement. "All lawsuits and other actions" undeniably means
and includes this litigation. The only remaining conceivable basis for challenging the
Settlement Agreement in this case, therefore, turns on the facts - whether the Settlement
Agreement is void because of, inter alia, fraud, undue influence, mistake, or other such
factors that could be a basis for invalidating any contract. See generally 15A Am.Jur.2d
Compromise and Settlement §§ 39-46, at 754-759 (2000).
The Tax Court's specific findings of fact foreclose any such assertions. Express
factual findings include: "There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal
by any of the parties to the Settlement Agreement!,]" Findings of Fact f 22, R. 002874,
Appendix B; "There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered
into the agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity,
disadvantage, injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy[,]" (Findings of
Fact, 123, R. 002874, Appendix B); "The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and
entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant[,]" (Findings
of Fact f 36, R. 002871, Appendix B; and, "The intent of the parties to settle its property
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tax disputes arising from 1995 through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal." (Findings of
Fact, f 37, R. 002871, Appendix B.)
C.

The Settlement Agreement was Legal, Reasonable and Supportable
Based Upon the Evidence*

Appellants argue the settlement is unlawful because "it was not to be based upon
fair market value, or 'equalized' assessments for any of the five assessment years, as
required by Utah's constitutional and statutory scheme for ad valorem taxation."
Assessor's Brief at 22; Granite's Brief at 19.

Fleshing out the concept, the Assessor

argues "There has been no showing [in an administrative hearing] that ATK's property
taxes were illegally or erroneously assessed," Assessor's Brief at 32, which hearing the
Assessor claims, is a necessary precursor to the Board's issuance of refunds under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-1321. The Assessor further argues the Board may only increase or
decrease any assessment contained in any assessment book, so as to equalize the
assessment of all classes, and, since the settlement is for a dollar refund, rather than a
reduced assessment, it is illegal. Assessor's Brief at 27.
These arguments are frivolous. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 provides that the
county legislative body may refund taxes "upon sufficient evidence being produced that
the property has been illegally or erroneously assessed." "Sufficient evidence" does not
require an administrative hearing, as the Assessor repeatedly argues. By its express
terms, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 does not preclude the Board from compromising or
settling litigation, as discussed above. Consequently, the Board's authority to refund
taxes under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321, or lower assessments in settlement of litigation

(which in turn results in a refund as contemplated in the Settlement Agreement), are
independent powers.

They derive from different sections of the Utah Code.

Yet

assuming Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1321 is the exclusive mechanism for property tax
refunds, the Assessor's argument that "no evidence has been produced" of
overassessment of Alliant's real and personal property at Bacchus Works is a
demonstrable fiction.
1.

Prior adjudicated decisions support the Settlement Agreement

For 1995, the Assessor originally determined the value of Alliant's real property in
Salt Lake County at $168,801,600. Alliant sought a value reduction to $82,865,542
before the Board. The Board lowered the assessment to $152,725,721. Alliant appealed
the Board's decision to the Tax Commission where the Assessor sought an increase to
approximately $205,000,000. Alliant sought a valuation of approximately $113,000,000.
Following a full evidentiary hearing, the Tax Commission rejected the Assessor's
proposed increase and sustained the lower value of $152,725,721. Alliant Techsystems,
Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Tax Commission Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Appeal No. 97-0031 ("Final Decision"), R.
000701-000673.
For 1996, the Assessor originally determined the value of Alliant's real property in
Salt Lake County at $168,003,500. Before the Board, Alliant sought a value reduction to
$82,965,641. The Assessor sought an increase to $253,197,000. The Board denied both
requests and sustained the original assessed value. On appeal to the Tax Commission, the
Board, prior to settlement, sought an increase to approximately $208,000,000. Alliant
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sought a valuation of $109,000,000 (including NIROP).

Again, following a full

evidentiary hearing on the 1996 assessment, which had been consolidated with the 1995
assessment, the Tax Commission once again rejected the Assessor's proposed increase
and sustained the lower value of $168,003,500. Id.
For 1997, 1998 and 1999, the Assessor's original assessed values were
approximately $256,000,000, $235,000,000 and $235,000,000, respectively, or on
average $242,000,000. For the same period of time, the Board's expert, Mr. Philip Cook,
recommended

assessments

of

$222,000,000,

$217,000,000

and

$238,000,000,

respectively, or on average $225,670,000. The Tax Commission rejected the Assessor's
values and sustained values of $215,210,000, $212,559,000, and $239,650,000. Alliant
Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Tax Commission Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Appeal No. 98-0452, 98-0608 & 99-0190
("Final Decision"), R. 002422-002440.

The average Commission sustained value for

1997-1999 is $222,443,000 or $54,437,500 higher than the value the Commission held
was the fair market value on the identical property for the previous year, 1996.
Nonetheless, the Commission sustained value for 1997-1999 is $19,557,000 lower than
the Assessor's initial assessed values for the same years.
The average values the Tax Commission sustained, following the full evidentiary
hearing, of $152,000,000 for 1995 and $168,000,000 for 1996, are respectively
$104,000,000 and $61,000,000 lower than the $229,100,000 average value the Assessor
sought for the same property for the same period of time; and $43,000,000 lower than the

$203,000,000 average value the Board through Mr. Cook sought for the same property
for the same period of time, prior to the Settlement Agreement.
The average value the Assessor sought before the Tax Court from 1995 through
1999 was approximately $238,000,000. The Tax Commission held in its Final Decision
in Appeal 97-0031 that Alliant proved the Assessor's assessments were too high, even
though Alliant had not carried its burden in proving what the lowered assessed values
should be. Based upon the Tax Commission's Final Decision in Appeal No. 97-0031 for
1995 and 1996, the average assessment of Alliant's real property from 1995 through 1999
should be no higher than $160,000,000, assuming no material change in the facility. On
this point, the evidence of prior decisions the Board reviewed is that the economic
outlook from 1996 to 1999 was substantially the same even though the assessment
increased from approximately $168 million to $256 million in a single year. R. 001657
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Approve Settlement). See also
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, Tax Commission
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Appeal No. 98-0452, 98-0608,
99-0190, R. 002440.
2.

Undisputed evidence the Board reviewed supports the Settlement
Agreement.

The Board also reviewed, at the insistence of the Assessor and District Attorney,
the depositions in the 1997-1999 consolidated Tax Commission cases. The deposition of
Paul Ross, former President of Alliant Aerospace Group and Senior Vice President of the
Corporation, discusses the circumstances and events that lead to the development and
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construction of the Salt Lake County Bacchus West facilities.

Simply stated, the

facilities have suffered economic obsolescence because they are overbuilt for their
present use. Ross testified that Hercules was "enticed" by NASA in 1984 to construct
facilities for manufacturing solid rocket motors for the space shuttle. With 24 flights
projected per year, no one contractor was capable of supplying all of NASA's
requirements. The building designs, pit sizes, diameters and heights were all made for
the shuttle motors, which are 12 feet in diameter and 149 feet in length, each containing
over a million pounds of propellant.

With the Challenger disaster in 1986, NASA

undertook a complete re-analysis of its programs and procurement policies. In 1988,
NASA announced that there would be no second source for the shuttle.

Hercules

immediately shifted its focus for Bacchus West to the Titan program, which although
using motors smaller than the shuttle, still required "big motors/' With the projected
manifest at the time, Hercules believed it could still recoup its investment in Bacchus
West. In 1994, the decision was made to stop the Titan program and move to EELV
(Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles). Hercules (and its successor Alliant) was not
successful in gaining the contracts for the EELV program. This leaves the Bacchus West
facility making reduced numbers of small motors (3.3 feet diameter, 32 feet in length, or
3.8 feet diameter, 36 feet in length) for commercial uses rather than the big motors (12
feet diameter and 149 feet in length) for which the facility was designed and built. The
Board reviewed these facts, none of which are in dispute, as a basis for settlement.
Deposition of Paul A. Ross (October 25, 2000). Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of
Joint Motion to Approve Settlement, R. 001655.
18

This evidence had significant impact upon the Board's deliberations in arriving at
the Settlement Agreement, even though the Assessor now claims there was no evidence
upon which to base a settlement. Having read the depositions in the case, Commissioner
Overson expressed doubt that the Assessor's astounding increases in Alliant's
assessments from 1996 to 1997 could possibly be justified because the solid rocket motor
fuels industry had in fact declined since the 1994 assessment at $110,000,000. At an
average tax rate of .014, the differences in taxes levied on the Assessor's proposed
assessments, which Alliant had already proved are too high, and the assessments the Tax
Commission had already sustained upon evidence submitted, approximate $1,000,000 per
year, or $5,000,000 from 1995 through 1999. Adding personal property and interest to
this figure would exceed $5,000,000, making it obvious that the Board's decision to settle
upon a $5,000,000 refund is reasonable. It is certainly not overly generous to Alliant.
Given such facts, Commissioner Overson stated at the December 6, 2000
Commission "He [Overson] cannot, with a clear conscience, accept that Alliant
Techsystem's value on this particular property went from $110 million in 1994 ta $200
million plus in 1999-2000." R. 001685. Commissioner Overson also challenged the
Assessor of misleading the Board by claiming that "they [Alliant] have not prevailed."
Said Mr. Overson, "[t]he Assessor's assertion that the Utah State Tax Commission
upheld the County's value failed to clarify that he [the Assessor] was trying to get much
higher values than what the Utah State Tax Commission actually approved." Id.
From the evidence summarized above, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the
Board was aware of the relevant facts related to Alliant's property tax disputes and that
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the Assessor had misrepresented the facts in fighting against the Settlement Agreement.
The Board clearly understood that lowering Alliant's assessed values on real and personal
property to justify a $5 million refund to Alliant was within the range of what the Board
and the Tax Commission had already decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing, and
the undisputed evidence the Board reviewed.
3.

The Board's review of the parties' appraisals confirms that the
Settlement Agreement is reasonable compromise between two widely
disparate positions*

Unlike the facts summarized above, the parties' respective appraisals were
disputed. Nonetheless the Board reviewed these appraisals and expressly stated that they
too formed a basis for the Settlement Agreement.

The evidence before the Board

consisted of two different and disparate appraisals—one by the Assessor's appraiser and
another by Alliant's appraiser—a review appraisal, which the County commissioned
Appraiser William Lang to determine whether the Settlement Agreement was reasonable
(R. 001767), and an evaluation of the hazards and costs of litigation in this case.
Commissioners Overson and Shurtleff clearly articulated the rationale behind the Board's
decision to reach a compromise settlement of the case.

The two commissioners'

statements demonstrate that the Board's decision was based first and foremost on a
careful weighing of two competing appraisals and of the qualifications and "track"
records of the appraisers of each party:
Commissioner Overson stated that ... he has a great deal of
respect for Phil Cook [the county's appraiser] but... He is
aware of a number of cases where Mr. Cook made similar
arguments, asserting higher values, which have been
overturned on a pretty regular basis. He himself is a state
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certified general appraiser ... [and] as he reviewed the expert
witness calculations, who [sic] came up with zero
obsolescence in one year and very, very little economical
obsolescence in a number of other years. This really bothered
him.... He didn't think the stock and debt valuation [used by
the county assessor] would be appropriate for this particular
property ... Although he didn't particularly agree with Alliant
Techsystem's position as to the amount of economic
obsolescence, he wholly rejected the idea that there is zero
economic obsolescence in a couple of the other years.... He
believed that the taxpayers should be justly treated; their
valuations should reflect the actual value of their properties.
He cannot, with a clear conscience, accept that Alliant
Techsystems' value on this particular property went from
$110 million in 1994 to $200 million plus in 1999-2000.
Minutes of Salt Lake County Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000), R. 001685.
In essence, the Board did not wholly agree with either of the two appraisals,
concluded that the fair market value of the property lay somewhere in the middle, and
settled the case accordingly. This type of administrative review and settlement of a
contested assessment value is central to the Board's function in making fact-based
judgments about assessment values.
This Court's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Board, or re weigh
the evidence the Board considered in negotiating and consummating the Settlement
Agreement. The Court's role is to review issues of fact (in this case the reasonableness
of the Settlement Agreement) under a "substantial evidence" standard. If there is any
evidence to support the Settlement Agreement, this Court should affirm the Tax Court's
Judgment concluding

the Settlement Agreement

constitutional."
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was "legal, enforceable

and

D.

The Settlement Agreement contemplated that the Tax Court will enter
an appropriate order lowering Alliant's assessments and ensuring that
the taxing entities within Salt Lake County may recover refunded
taxes.

The Assessor also argues that the Settlement Agreement is illegal because it is for
a dollar refund rather than a reduced assessment. Assessor's Brief at 27. This argument
misreads the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement expressly contemplates
"a reduction in value" as one of several possible means for repayment to Alliant. The
negotiated terms are "subject to execution of a settlement agreement and stipulation
incorporating the terms hereof, final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the
District Court and entry of appropriate judgments and order sufficient to authorize Salt
Lake County and the taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover all refunds paid
through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy."
(emphasis added), Appendix A.

Settlement Agreement at 1

For reasons previously explained, the Settlement

Agreement would be legal even without this language because Utah Code Ann. § 59-21321 gives the county legislative body authority to refund taxes illegally or erroneously
assessed. By the terms of the Settlement Agreement, however, an appropriate Order,
presumably lowering the assessment to generate $5 million in refunds, could be entered,
thereby mooting the Assessor's argument that the Settlement Agreement is illegal.
Finally, this Court should affirm the Tax Court's approval of the Settlement
Agreement because it is, in fact, an adjustment of the Assessor's valuation pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. 59-2-1002(3). This provision states that the Board may "make and enter
new assessments, at the same time canceling previous entries, when any assessment made
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by the assessor is considered by the board to be incomplete or incorrect." In this case, the
Board's reduction of the assessment was fully justified by the evidence before it and
should thus be upheld under the presumption of validity given to the Board's valuations
under Utah law and general legal principles.
II.

THE TAX COURT PROPERLY HAD JURISDICTION OVER ALL YEARS
COVERED BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WHEN IT ENTERED
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER
AND JUDGMENT THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS LEGAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ENFORCEABLE,
The Assessor devotes considerable verbiage in his brief to arguing the Settlement

Agreement is invalid and unenforceable under a variety of typical contractual doctrines
and principles — failure of the parties to satisfy a necessary condition, lack of mutual
assent for the agreement and/or failure of the consideration for the agreement. Assessor's
Brief at 35-41. Please note that the principal parties to the Settlement Agreement - the
County itself, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant - make no such
arguments. If the Assessor's arguments had merit, one would suppose the County or the
Board, seeing the County foisted with an unfair agreement, would be among those
protesting its validity on appeal. Assuming the County Council and/or the County Mayor
take their duties seriously, the County's very silence on appeal betokens the inherent
fairness of the Settlement Agreement, not its unfairness. Were that not the case, the
County's present "benign neutrality" of silence would instead be a dereliction of duty.
Claiming he is not a party to the Settlement Agreement that was intended to bind the
"County, its officers and attorneys," the Assessor inconsistently claims he has statutorily
imposed duties as a County officer to save the County from an ill-advised and illegal
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disaster.

Each of the Assessor's alleged contractual defenses are "make weight"

arguments that are easily dismissed.
A,

The Tax Commission's and the Tax Court's initial failure to approve
the Settlement Agreements did not violate or fail to fulfill a material
"Condition Precedent" to the Agreement's validity, thereby rendering
the Settlement Agreement null and void.

The Assessor argues the Tax Commission and the Tax Court's initial refusal to
enforce the Settlement Agreement renders it "invalid and unenforceable" because "a
material condition precedent failed to occur." Assessor's Brief at 37. Granite repeats
essentially the same argument, stating "The Settlement Agreement is unenforceable
because a condition precedent [the Tax Commission's approval] failed." Granite's Brief
at 22. Such arguments are demonstrably specious for at least three reasons:
First, while the Settlement Agreement did contemplate the parties to the agreement
would "seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah
State Tax Commission approving the Settlement Agreement" [Settlement Agreement at
2, R.001412, Appendix A], an order of approval was not a condition precedent to the
agreement's binding effect as a contract upon the Board and Alliant. Rather, securing an
order of approval was nothing more than recognition of jurisdictional reality as it existed
at that time—jurisdiction for tax years 1995 and 1996 resided in the Tax Court for a "trial
de novo" and jurisdiction for tax years 1997, 1998, and 1999 resided in the Tax
Commission, for a formal hearing. Acknowledging jurisdictional prerequisites in the
Settlement Agreement does not transform them to conditions precedent to the
agreement's validity.

Nor does Alliant's continued effort to seek the Tax Court's

44

approval of the Settlement Agreement unilaterally change the consideration for the
agreement. An analysis of the reasons the Tax Commission and the Tax Court did not
initially approve the Settlement Agreement supports, rather than undermines, this
conclusion.
The Tax Commission's Order on Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement dated
March 7, 2001, [R.002449 through 002442} declines approval of the Settlement
Agreement because Granite had intervened to challenge the agreement.

The

Commission's order states that Granite "had moved to intervene prior to the stipulated
settlement" so approval would require Granite to accept such a settlement "against its
will." R.002447.

In the Tax Court's words, "The Tax Commission's rejection of the

Settlement Agreement did not focus on constitutional difficulties and problematic
implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but primarily upon the Settlement
Agreement's failure to include a potential intervenor." Findings of Fact f 38, R. 002871,
Appendix B.
Similarly, the Tax Court initially declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement
because it lacked jurisdiction over all of the years subject to the agreement. The Tax
Court Decision of September 20, 2001 makes this perfectly clear:
Clearly the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over
some cases and this court has jurisdiction over others. The
Court recognized the divisibility of jurisdiction between the
Court and the Utah State Tax Commission. . . while this
Court accepts the divisibility of jurisdiction it is of the
opinion that the refund amount of $5 million is indivisible
and non-allocable between the various tax years. Therefore,
even though the Court disagrees with the legal theory relied
upon by the Utah State Tax Commission, the court has no
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option but to reluctantly disapprove the Settlement
Agreement. . . the rejection decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission forces this court to reject a settlement agreement
which it believes is valid and legally sustainable.
Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 25; R.001987, 001963, Appendix C.
This language proves the Tax Commission and the Tax Court initially declined to
enforce the Settlement Agreement for pragmatic, procedural reasons, having nothing to
do with the agreement's alleged invalidity/unenforceability as a contract.

To argue

otherwise in the face of this language is untenable. The Tax Commission's and the Tax
Court's respective initial disapprovals were unrelated to any contractual defenses to
enforceability, as the Assessor and Granite now assert.
Second, the Tax Court properly held the Tax Commission's disapproval of the
Settlement Agreement "does not exclude this [the District] Court from conducting a
careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is not permissible by this [the
District] Court." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 25, R. 001987,
001963, Appendix C. As explained above, the Tax Commission did not approve the
Settlement Agreement because Granite was an intervenor in the Tax Commission
proceeding.

The Tax Commission opined its approval of the Settlement Agreement

"would require a necessary party [Granite School District} that had moved to intervene
prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such a settlement against its will."
002447]

[R.

The question then arises whether the Tax Commission thought Granite's

participation, as an intervening party, was limited to its challenge of the Settlement
Agreement, or that the Settlement Agreement could not be enforced because Granite was
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not a party to it.

Granite compounds this same ambiguity, arguing that when it

intervened in the Tax Commission matter, thereby causing the Tax Commission to reject
the Settlement, consideration under the agreement failed. Granite's Brief at 29-30.
This is muddled thinking.

The Tax Commission's analysis seems to equate

participation in settlement discussions with the right to intervene in the underlying
lawsuits.

There can be no settlement, according to the Tax Commission, without

everyone who could possibly assert an interest via intervention in the underlying lawsuits
participating in the Settlement Agreement. The fatal defect in this analysis is a failure to
recognize an unassailable fact — that parties to a lawsuit can always settle the differences
between them notwithstanding the objection of third persons. The Settlement Agreement
is binding as a contract between the parties to that contract, whether or not intervention
may be available to parties opposed to the contract or desirous of undermining the
contract in litigation. Granting intervention status to the Assessor and Granite merely
gave them an opportunity to voice their views on the Settlement Agreement, which they
did. Intervention does not give intervenors an absolute veto power over settlements with
which they disagree. See, e.g., Millard County v. State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459, 464
(Utah 1991) ("However, we need not now decide whether, after intervention has been
allowed in a local option sales tax case, the Commission may settle a case over an
intervenor's objection.")
Hence, the Tax Commission got it wrong. The Tax Commission's failure to
enforce the Settlement Agreement reflects what the Tax Court accurately called a "legally
impermissible" ground. Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 24, R. 001987,
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001964, Appendix B. It is well settled law that parties contract for their own benefit,
unless otherwise stated, and not for the benefit of a third person. See, generally, SME
Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 28 P.3d 669, 684 (Utah 2001). There is a limited exception
to this general rule if the parties explicitly agree that a third party shall have enforceable
legal rights. If performance of the promissor is to run directly to the promissee, any third
party contemplated under the agreement is an unprotected incidental beneficiary, having
no enforceable rights under the contract. See, e.g., American Towers Owners Ass'n v.
CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); McCinnico v. Marrs, 320 F.2d 22
(10th Cir. 1963). Alliant has searched but discovered no case law for the proposition that
persons not party to a contract can set the contract aside as unenforceable.
In this case, the Assessor has no standing to challenge the Settlement Agreement
because, as a County officer (though he claims not to be a County officer), he may not
unilaterally repudiate a County contract without breaching the contract, as he has done.
Granite, as an intervenor in the lawsuit, has standing to complain about the contract, but
no standing under the Settlement Agreement to derail it. Granite does not qualify as a
third-party beneficiary under the Settlement Agreement under any conceivable theory
because the contract is between and binding on Salt Lake County, its officers (including
the Assessor) and attorneys and Alliant. The salient terms of the Settlement Agreement
are that Salt Lake County will pay Alliant $5 million for dismissal of its unliquidated
claims against the County. Under the express terms of the Settlement Agreement, it does
not matter what the source of funding will be—whether from the County's reserves, or a
judgment levy. The Settlement Agreement states, "Payment of the refund [to Alliant], at
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the taxing entities' option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or
from the proceeds of the judgment levy." Settlement Agreement at 2, R. 001412,
Appendix A. In other words, Granite need play no role whatsoever in refunding $5
million to Alliant. Thus, the instant Settlement Agreement is indistinguishable in this
respect from a settlement agreement between the County and a plaintiff asserting
damages under an unliquidated tort claim. Neither the County nor Alliant intended to
give Granite any rights and claims under the settlement. Instead, there was a bargainedfor exchange between the parties (the County, its officers, attorneys and Alliant)
constituting a benefit to the promissor and a detriment to the promissee. That is all that is
necessary for enforcement of the contract.
Notwithstanding clear law against them, Granite, an intervenor, and the Assessor,
a breaching party to the Settlement Agreement, seek to undermine its enforceability in a
way that will inflict severe damage to well-established contract law and public policy.
Were Appellants to prevail, all future, and possibly past, settlements between the County
and a plaintiff would become vulnerable. The precedent would be that an unforeseen
third party or a breaching party may overturn a perfectly legal contract. Likewise, as the
Tax Court noted, a settlement agreement between a taxpayer and a county could be held
hostage by a mosquito abatement district. Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001
at 13, R.001987, 001975, Appendix C. No one would wish to settle if Appellants'
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arguments become law.

That is why the public policy favors enforcement of the

Settlement Agreement.10
Third and most importantly, the Tax Commission's consideration of the
Settlement Agreement was solely in its role as the tribunal then having supervisory
authority or jurisdiction over certain tax years included in the settlement, not as a party to
the agreement.

Consequently, the Tax Commission's approval of the Settlement

Agreement is not a condition precedent to the agreement's validity. The Assessor's
citation of Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. 1998), is
totally beside the point. Alliant agrees with the Assessor that "in Curtis, the Indiana
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a settlement agreement that explicitly
required the approval of a component party was binding on the party without that
approval." Assessor's Brief at 37 (emphasis added).11
Obviously, settlement agreements that require prior approval of a party are invalid
if that party fails to approve the agreement. But here the Tax Commission was never a
10

Granite's argument that the Settlement Agreement, if enforced, will inevitably result in
"disparate treatment" is absolutely false. Under the explicit terms of the Settlement
Agreement, the County is free to refund the $5 million from whatever source it desires.
11

In Curtis, the Court disapproved the settlement in part because the Governor had not
consented to the settlement in violation of a statute that required his approval. There is
no such statute in this case. The only governmental body that was a necessary party to
the Settlement Agreement was the Salt Lake County Commission, which approved the
settlement. In the words of David Yocom, District Attorney for Salt Lake County, "there
was no question that the Commission has the ultimate authority to control litigation and
to determine what settlement amounts should be offered."
Minutes of County
Commission Meeting (December 6, 2000) at 2, R. 001686. Alliant agrees with Mr.
Yocom on this point. One wonders, therefore, why the County sought to invalidate the
terms of its own agreement [Findings of Fact f 21, R. 002874] when Mr. Yocom had
already opined the County Commission had plenary legal authority to settle litigation.
—
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party to the Settlement Agreement, just as the Tax Court was not a party to the Settlement
Agreement. The Tax Court's September 20, 2001 Decision easily grasps this point. It
states, "Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over some cases and this
[District] Court has jurisdiction over others." Tax Court Decision dated September 20,
2001 at 25, R. 001963, Appendix C There is no intimation that the Tax Commission was
a necessary party to the agreement or that its approval was anything more than a
jurisdictional prerequisite.

The Tax Court further held the Tax Commission's

disapproval of the Settlement Agreement had no binding effect upon the Tax Court, no
matter the Tax Commission's reasons for disapproval.

The Tax Court's holding is

logically inescapable because jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement approval is not
interminably vested in the Tax Commission. Findings of Fact f 14, R. 002875, Appendix
B.
Conspicuously absent from any of Appellants' arguments is reference to the
controlling jurisdictional statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1), which provides that "the
district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the
commission after ...[July 1, 1994] resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings."
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(2) continues to foreclose any legitimate
argument that any of the Tax Commission's decisions should be given any weight by
explicitly defining "de novo" to mean "an original independent proceeding, [which] does
not mean a trial de novo on the record." (Emphasis added.) Appendix D.
On September 21, 2001, Alliant appealed the Tax Commission's Final Decision in
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Nos. 98-0452, 98-
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0608, and 99-0191, dated September 18, 2001, to the Tax Court. As a result of these
appeals, the 1997, 1998 and 1999 real property tax disputes subject to the Settlement
Agreement were before the Tax Court "de novo," in an "original and independent"
proceeding.

Nothing in the Tax Commission proceeding, including the Tax

Commission's "legally impermissible" disapproval of the Settlement Agreement, is
binding upon the Tax Court. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604, the district court "may
affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the commission, and shall grant other
relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in accordance with its decision,
as appropriate" (Emphasis added). If Appellants' arguments prevail, the explicit wording
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-601 through 604 would be eliminated. In other words, the
Tax Court's September 20, 2001 Decision correctly stated, "The ruling of the Utah State
Tax Commission does not preclude this Court from independently examining the
Settlement Agreement." Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 14, R. 001974,
Appendix C.
B.

The Tax Commission's disapproval of the Settlement Agreement
necessitated a subsequent formal hearing on the merits of the case,
which is neither a "waiver of Alliant's appeal rights," nor
"acquiescence" in the Tax Commission's disapproval.

The Assessor's next argument is that Alliant somehow accepted or acquiesced in
the Tax Commission's failure to enforce the Settlement Agreement by not taking an
immediate appeal from the Tax Commission's order of disapproval. The Assessor
asserts, "By proceeding to formal hearing, all parties to the Settlement acquiesced in the
Tax Commission's denial of the Settlement and effectively repudiated the Agreement

rendering it invalid and unenforceable."

Assessor's Brief at 38. In support of this

argument, the Assessor cites various cases to the effect that compliance with a court's
judgment moots an appeal. Id.
The cases the Assessor cites do not support the arguments he advances. When
apples are compared to apples, the invalidity of the Assessor's criticisms becomes
undeniable. Had Alliant sought immediate appeal from the Tax Commission's failure to
enforce the Settlement Agreement, the appellate courts would have dismissed the appeal
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, no doubt with Appellants' strong urging.
The law on this issue is clear, and succinctly summarized in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 974 P.2d 286 (Utah 1999), a case in which the taxpayer attempted, and
failed, to do just what the Assessor asserts should have been done here—take an
interlocutory appeal from a Tax Commission ruling before the Commission issued a Final
Order.
However, interlocutory appeals are not allowed. Said the Court in Hercules, "by
filing its declaratory judgment action, Hercules attempted to obtain judicial review of an
interlocutory and otherwise unappealable Tax Commission order. As the Tax Court
correctly noted, '[This] attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to seek review of an
interlocutory order [was] procedurally improper.'" Id. at 287. The Court added, "such
review may only be sought from final agency action, meaning that the agency's decision
must have fully disposed of the case." Id. (emphasis in original).
Consistent with Hercules, Alliant here sought judicial review of the Tax
Commission's Final Order in the 1997, 1998 and 1999 valuation cases on September 21,

604432.2

53

2001. One of the grounds for relief in Alliant's Petition for Review asserts "Salt Lake
County, its officers and attorneys," including Lee Gardner the Assessor, breached the
Settlement Agreement in refusing to seek to secure its approval, and that the Tax
Commission wrongfully denied the joint motion to approve the agreement.

Affiant

Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization et al, No. 010908307 at
f 22. Alliant could not have sought reversal of the Tax Commission's disapproval of the
Settlement Agreement any sooner than it did.
Equally illogical is the Assessor's argument that Alliant waived its right to appeal
the Tax Commission's failure to enforce the Settlement Agreement by submitting to the
formal hearing on the merits of the property tax disputes before the Tax Commission.
Argues the Assessor, "At significant expense, the parties submitted their respective
appraisals and cross-examined witnesses to determine the value of ATK's real property
for 1997 through 1999. In doing so, ATK (and the BOE) effectively repudiated the
Agreement and waived the right to further challenge the Tax Commission's rejection of
the Settlement." Assessor's Brief at 39.
The incontestable inference of the Assessor's argument is that the one and only
reason for settlement was to eliminate the costs and risks associated with the fonnal
hearing in front of the Tax Commission on the 1997, 1998 and 1999 tax years. And so
the argument continues, by participating in the Tax Commission hearing, Alliant's
consideration supporting the Settlement Agreement had failed. Such an inference badly
misses the mark.

The truth is there were numerous reasons, legal and economic, supporting the
Settlement Agreement besides eliminating the costs and risks associated with the Tax
Commission's formal hearing. Indeed, the "County, its officers and attorneys," including
the Assessor, have been caught in their own snare. The reason there has been no
termination of the litigation costs, but instead a perpetuation of such is because the
"County, its officers and attorneys" have refused to honor the Settlement Agreement they
themselves drafted. The escalation of litigation costs has nothing to do with Alliant,
which has taken the County at its word since December 6, 2000, the date the County
Commission approved the Settlement Agreement.
Equally important, all parties to the Settlement Agreement continue to face
litigation risks and expenses because, were the Settlement Agreement to fail, the parties
would then undergo a "trial de novo," in the Tax Court as if the trial before the Tax
Commission had never happened. The risks of litigation thus remain substantial for all
parties if the Settlement Agreement is not enforced. That aspect of consideration
supporting the Settlement Agreement remains relevant even today.
Most important, had the "County, its officers and attorneys" kept their word, the
costs and risks associated with continuing litigation would likely have long since been
eliminated, just as Alliant said, and the case would likely now be over. The Settlement
Agreement was signed almost three years ago. Since then, the Assessor has repeatedly
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imposed stumbling blocks to the Settlement Agreement's successful consummation,
while the County feigns "benign neutrality."12
AUiant has found no case in all American Jurisprudence in which the party
breaching a settlement agreement (the Assessor) has been able to assert its own breach as
the reason for lack of mutual assent and/or failure of consideration which invalidates the
agreement. The notion is preposterous.
C.

Alliant's dismissal of its personal property tax claims before the Tax
Commission was to fulfill its obligations under the Settlement
Agreement

The Assessor's next distortion is his argument that AUiant's dismissal of its
pending personal property tax claims before the Tax Commission constitutes a failure of
the consideration for and a unilateral attempt to rewrite the Settlement Agreement.
Assessor's Brief at 40. The sinister motives that the Assessor seems to infer from
AUiant's actions "spin" the facts to appear the opposite from what they really are. Rather
than a repudiation of the Settlement Agreement, AUiant's dismissal of its personal
property tax claims was undertaken to fulfill its obligations under the Settlement

12

One of many examples was the County's opposition to AUiant's Motion to Transfer
AUiant's appeal of the Tax Commission Final Order on the 1997-1999 valuation cases
from Tax Court Judge Pat B. Brian to Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis. AUiant argued
the transfer would make it easier to enforce the Settlement Agreement since Judge Davis
had jurisdiction over the NIROP and the 1995-1996 valuation cases. Yet the County
resisted, claiming inconvenience in driving to Provo, though its attorneys had so driven
for the related tax cases. Judge Brian rejected the County's argument and transferred the
1997-1999 valuation cases to Judge Davis. If the County truly sought to reduce litigation
risks and costs, there is, of course, nothing that prevents the County, even now, from
keeping its word, honoring the Settlement Agreement, paying what it promised to pay
and mooting this appeal. If the Settlement Agreement is not upheld, litigation expenses
will likely be incurred for years to come.
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Agreement. The Settlement Agreement, by its express terms, "includes all claims in all
outstanding actions for those years involving real and personal property/' Settlement
Agreement dated December 5, 2000 at 1; R.001412, Appendix A (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement covered the pending personal property disputes
as well as the real property disputes. Had Alliant refused or failed to withdraw its
personal property tax claims, it would have violated the Settlement Agreement and part
of the County's consideration for settlement would have been lost. The truth is exactly
the opposite from what the Assessor labels as a failure of consideration resulting from
"ATK's extreme action in withdrawing its personal property tax claims." Assessor's
Brief at 41. Alliant's dismissal of its personal property claims fulfills the Settlement
Agreement's requirements, rather than "altering its consideration."

Alliant kept its

promise.
Granite's somewhat different arguments against the Settlement Agreement are
likewise transparently shallow. The underpinnings for much of Granite's arguments rest
on its assertion that the Tax Court erred in holding that it was not bound by the Tax
Commission's decision, which recognized Granite as a respondent-intervenor, and
rejected the Settlement Agreement. Granite's Brief at 27. Granite ultimately became, in
fact, a defendant-intervenor in the Tax Court when the 1995-1999 valuation cases were
functionally consolidated.13

Granite thinks the Tax Court's separate approval of the

13

By "valuation cases," Alliant refers to those cases in which it protested its assessed
value before the County Board of Equalization and then the Tax Commission. These are
the 1995-1996 valuation case, and the 1997-1999 valuation case referenced in Judge
Davis' Findings/Conclusions. Although the 1995-1999 valuation cases were never
604432.2
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Settlement Agreement in the 1995-1996 valuation case (in which Granite had not timely
intervened) would mystically have changed the outcome of Judge Davis' decision
upholding the Settlement Agreement when the Tax Court eventually acquired jurisdiction
over the 1997-1999 valuation case (in which Granite had intervened before the Tax
Commission).

Granite argues Judge Davis had no alternative but to remand the

combined 1995-1999 valuation cases to the Tax Commission, although the Tax
Commission had already rejected the Settlement Agreement in the 1997-1999 valuation
case, solely on the grounds that Granite was not a party to an agreement between Aliiant
and Salt Lake County.

Granite stresses this argument, without disclosing even an

awareness of the Utah statute vesting the Tax Court with de novo jurisdiction on appeals
from the Tax Commission.
There are obvious, multiple and insurmountable flaws with Granite's arguments.
First, Granite's arguments cannot possibly be reconciled with Utah statutes, which
Granite, either intentionally or negligently, fails even to cite, much less discuss, and
which contradict its contention that the Tax Court is somehow bound by any Tax
Commission decision. The relevant statute that Granite ignores is Utah Code Ann. § 591-601, which provides in its entirety:

formally consolidated by a formal order of consolidation, they were functionally
consolidated because they were considered and decided together and simultaneously.
The valuation cases are distinguished from the "independent" or "N1ROP" action, in
which Aliiant challenged the legality of the County's imposition of a privilege tax on
AUiant on the unapportioned assessed value of its use of federal property. The three
cases (the 1995-1996 valuation case, the 1997-1999 valuation case and the "independent"
action) were functionally consolidated for purposes of the Tax Court's
Findings/Conclusions in this case.
—

-
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(1)
In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 6346b-15, beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by
the commission after that date resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.
(2)
As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an
original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de
novo on the record.
(3)
(a)
In any appeal to the district court pursuant to
this section taken after January 1, 1997, the commission shall
certify a record of its proceedings to the district court.
(b)
This Subsection (3) supersedes Section 63-46b16 pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings.
In Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435
(Utah 1997), this Court held that a prior version of Section 59-1-601 was unconstitutional
because it conflicted with the Tax Commission's vested powers under Utah Const., Art.
XIII, § 11 and Art. V, § 1.

However, in 1998, the Utah voters by an overwhelming

majority approved an amendment to Utah Const., Art. XIII, § 11, now Art. XIII, § 6.
This constitutional amendment provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding the powers
granted to the State Tax Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute
authorize any court established under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or
determine any matter decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and
taxation/' The 1998 constitutional amendment reinstated Section 59-1-601.
As with any statute, Section 59-1-601 should be interpreted according to the plain
meaning of its language. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879
(Utah 1993) ("The court's principal duty in interpreting statutes is to determine
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legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the
statute.") It should, therefore, be beyond dispute that "original" means "not secondary,
derivative or imitative," Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "original"; and that
"independent" means "not subject to control by others," id. at "independent." If these
statutory words are given their intended effect, the Tax Court is not "bound" by Tax
Commission decisions, as Granite asserts. Simply stated, Granite's argument is directly
repugnant to plain and controlling statutory language to the contrary. Recognizing this,
Judge Davis wrote that "Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third Judicial
District Court, seeking 'review by trial de novo' under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 of the
Tax Commission's [various decisions,]." Mem. Dec. (June 3, 2002) at 17, R. 002641,
Appendix F. Given this statutory language, Judge Davis concluded, "The rejection of the
Settlement Agreement by the Utah State Tax Commission does not exclude this Court
from conducting a careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is not
permissible by this Court." Id. at 25.
Second, Granite distorts this Court's decision in Millard County v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991) by making it appear that its intervention in the Tax
Commission proceeding to oppose the Settlement Agreement is the necessary equivalent
of having its opposing views prevail in the Tax Court. As the quintessential incongruous
comparison of apples and oranges, Granite writes:
The Tax Court rejected this theory [that Granite was a
necessary party to the Settlement Agreement], even though it
did not determine the viability of the Settlement Agreement
until a full nine months after Granite filed its motion to
intervene and seven months after Granite's motion was
An

granted. Thus, by the time the Settlement Agreement was
ruled upon, Granite was a party and the case could not be
disposed of, in its entirety, absent Granite's consent and
approval.
Granite's Brief at 30-31.
To untangle Granite's thinking, Alliant begins with a recitation of Millard
County's express holding. The issue in Millard County was whether the County had a
right of intervention in a Tax Commission proceeding to challenge a settlement
agreement between Intermountain Power Agency and the Tax Commission in a sales tax
case. This Court held that the Tax Commission erred in denying intervention. However,
the Court neither stated nor implied that the County's intervention to challenge the
settlement agreement meant its opposition to settlement must necessarily triumph. In
fact, the Court expressly reserved that issue, stating, "we need not now decide whether,
after intervention has been allowed in a local option sales tax case, the Commission may
settle a case over an intervenor's objection." Id. at 464. Granite's brief thus omits the
most important statement in Millard pertaining to this case. Compounding the confusion,
Granite misleads the Court by citing passages in Millard, knowing they are inapplicable.
An example is Page 28 of Granite's brief in which it quotes the following statement from
Millard: "[T]he settlement of a controversy by the parties before a motion to intervene as
of right has been adjudicated does not constitute a final settlement and does not moot
either the motion or an appeal from a denial of that motion." Id., quoting Millard at 461
(emphasis in Granite's brief).
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The principal defect with Granite's selective quotation from Millard is its
emphasis on facts that have no parallel to the facts here, and its disregard of facts that do
have a striking parallel. Unlike Millard* in which the Tax Commission and the taxpayer
consummated a settlement agreement in the face of an "extant motion" to intervene, the
Settlement Agreement in this case was consummated before Granite moved to intervene
in the Tax Court. There was no extant motion to intervene before Judge Davis at the time
he approved the Settlement Agreement as it pertained to the 1995-1996 valuation case
then before him.

Here again, Granite selectively quotes only part of Judge Davis'

decision that implies Granite was unfairly treated. Granite's Brief at 28. What Granite
omits is Judge Davis' recitation of the all-important time table in the 1995-1996 valuation
case—then the only valuation case over which he had jurisdiction. Said Judge Davis:
It is a matter of record in this Court that the Board of
Education of Granite School District faxed a copy of its
Motion to Intervene under Rule 24(a) on December 7, 2000
and filed an original on January 8, 2001. If counsel for
Alliant is accurate, the stipulated settlement agreement was
entered into on December 5, 2000 and was approved by the
Salt Lake County Commission on December 6, 2000. It is
clear there wasn't even a faxed copy of a motion to intervene
on file with this Court at the time of the settlement. If the
motion did not precede the County Commission action, then
this Court cannot give any weight to a potential filing of a
potential intervenor who potentially might become a future
party to the action.
Tax Court Decision dated September 20, 2001 at 13, R. 001975, Appendix C.
Granite notes that its motion to intervene was filed with the Tax Commission on
November 17, 2000, well before the County Commission approved the Settlement
Agreement on December 6, 2000. Yet Granite chooses not to disclose relevant facts that
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paint the entire, accurate picture. Granite knew the Settlement Agreement encompassed
the 1995-1996 valuation case, then before Judge Davis, as well as the 1997-1999
valuation case, then before the Tax Commission,

At the time, jurisdiction in the

valuation cases for tax years 1995 through 1999 inclusive was divided between the Tax
Court (on petition for review from the Tax Commission for years 1995-1996), and the
Tax Commission (on appeal from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization for years
1997-1999). Filing a motion to intervene with the Tax Commission is not equivalent to
filing a motion to intervene with the Tax Court for prior years, over which the Tax
Commission then had no jurisdiction. The Tax Commission lost jurisdiction when
Alliant filed its Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in the 19971999 valuation case under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604. At that point, the Tax Court's
September 20, 2001 decision, premised on what was then split jurisdiction between the
Tax Court (1995-1996) and the Tax Commission (1997-1999), was mooted. As a
respondent-intervenor before the Tax Commission, Granite automatically became a
defendant-intervenor when Alliant filed its Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's
final decision in the 1997-1999 valuation case before Judge Davis. Granite subsequently
and strenuously voiced its objections to the Settlement Agreement before Judge Davis,
exceeding hundreds of pages in the aggregate, which the Tax Court considered and
rejected. There are no parallel facts in Millard, which thus has no application whatsoever
to this case.
Third, Granite selectively manipulates applicable statutes by quoting only Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-604 (3) as the seeming universe of statutes pertaining to the Tax
604432.2
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Court's jurisdiction over Tax Commission final decisions. Section 604(3) provides that
the Tax Court "may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the commission."
Granite's Brief at 31. Granite argues this statute somehow requires the Tax Court to give
the Tax Commission some deference. But the argument disregards Utah Code Ann. § 591-601, which, as quoted above, vests the Tax Court with "original" and "independent"
jurisdiction in a "trial de novo."

An honest reading of the words "original" and

"independent" implies, at the very least, that the Tax Court is not bound by anything the
Tax Commission decides. To compound its misleading omission of relevant statutes,
Granite misrepresents the state of the law by quoting Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, 702 P.2d 451, 457 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that "the Tax Court could
simply not replace its judgment for that of the Tax Commission." Granite's Brief at 31.
In 1985, Kennecotfs holding was indisputably the state of law.
argument in 2004 is nonsense.

Clinging to that

Since Kennecott, the Utah Constitution has been

amended, as explained above, giving the legislature express authority to "authorize any
court . . . to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter decided by the
State Tax Commission." The very words of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604(3), upon which
Granite exclusively relies, do not mandate a "remand," as Granite contends was the Tax
Court's only choice. Granite's Brief at 31. Among the explicit options open to the Tax
Court was reversal of the Tax Commission. It is, therefore, logically indefensible for
Granite to insist that "the Tax Court" erred when it did not chose remand, as Granite
would have preferred. After extensive briefing, repeated oral argument, and repeated Tax
Court decisions rethinking and reaffirming its previous analyses, the Tax Court reversed

the Tax Commission, as was its express statutory prerogative. The Tax Court's decision
to reverse the Tax Commission, rather than remand the case, makes eminent sense
because the aggrieved party before the Tax Commission would have petitioned for
review under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 in a "trial de novo," thus bringing the matter
back to Judge Davis from whence the remand would have come.

Granite's preference

for an unduly inefficient remand, in the face of a statute giving the Tax Court "de novo"
jurisdiction, would have served no legitimate purpose, and would have unnecessarily
hiked the costs of litigation for everyone. Reduced to its essence, Granite's argument is
simply that it does not like what Judge Davis decided.
IIL

ASSESSOR GARDNER WAS COVERED BY THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
The Tax Court awarded attorneys' fees in favor of Alliant and against the Assessor

as a result of the Assessor's continuing efforts to defeat the Settlement Agreement in
direct contravention of the express terms of the Agreement. The Settlement Agreement
provides "the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in
enforcing the Settlement Agreement." Settlement Agreement dated December 5, 2002 at
2, R.001412, Appendix A. The District Court correctly applied this attorneys' fees
provision as the basis for its attorneys' fees award.
Not surprisingly, the Assessor vigorously defends his actions and claims that the
award of attorneys' fees should be reversed. Regrettably, however, the Assessor has been
less than candid in his brief in arguing the attorneys' fees issue, going so far as claiming
the "award of Attorney fees present issues of law." Assessor's Brief at 4. Under the
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Assessor's Issue No. 3, he states, "Application by the District Court of constitutional and
statutory standards for determination of the authority of a County Assessor and award of
attorney's fees present issues of law. The Supreme Court will apply a correction standard
to issues of law and will not defer to the Tax Court's conclusions." Id. A similar claim is
also made by the Assessor under his Issue No. 4, also related to the attorneys' fees issue.
Assessor's Brief at 5. Such claims are obvious distortions.
In the abstract it undoubtedly is true that application of constitutional and statutory
standards present matters of law. However, "If the language within the four corners of
the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of
law.'" Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, \

12, 62 P.3d 440 (quoting WebBank v.

American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 1139)(emphasis added).
At least from Appellants' perspective, the "four corners" of the Settlement Agreement are
arguably unclear since the Assessor, an officer of Salt Lake County, claims not to be
included within the Settlement Agreement that binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and
attorneys." From the Assessor's perspective, the contractual issues he raises are not
issues of law because, he thinks, the contract is ambiguous. As further discussed in
Alliant's statement of issues, interpretation of the Settlement Agreement raises an issue
of fact because the Tax Court relied, in part, on extrinsic evidence to conclude the
Assessor was a party to the Settlement Agreement. Consequently, constitutional and
statutory standards have nothing whatever to do with the award of attorneys' fees in
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accordance with the express contractual terms negotiated and approved by the parties to a
negotiated contract. The Assessor has once again argued a non sequitur.
In the present controversy, the attorneys' fees award results from the Tax Court's
interpretation and application of contractual remedies the parties wrote into the
Settlement Agreement when one party to the agreement, in this case the Assessor, fails to
keep his end of the bargain. Determining whether or not the Assessor was covered under
the terms of the Settlement Agreement and subject to its remedy provision is a specific
factual inquiry that can only be made through analysis and interpretation of the
Settlement Agreement's language and the relationships and intent of the settling parties.
Such factual inquiries and interpretations are always within the prerogative of the finder
of fact. Hence, to preserve his right to challenge the attorneys' fees award, the Assessor
is obligated to marshal and identify all evidence on which the Tax Court relied and then
demonstrate that such evidence is insubstantial. See, e.g., Neeley v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724,
726 (Utah App 2002); Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc., 29 P.3d 629, n. 8 (Utah 2001).
The Assessor's brief makes no attempt whatsoever to comply with mandatory
"marshaling" standards.

Accordingly, the Assessor's arguments that the Settlement

Agreement's remedy provision is invalid and/or not binding on the Assessor must
necessarily fail. It is simply too late for the Assessor to attempt to marshal the evidence
in a reply brief. See, e.g., Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053, 1062
("[the] eleventh hour attempt to marshal the evidence and challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence in a reply brief is too late.")
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In disregard of the "marshaling" requirement, the Assessor's brief substitutes a
conclusory statement that "[T]he Court's ruling on attorney fees is unsupported by the
record and legally flawed. Assessor's Brief at 43. Instead of citing the record that would
conceivably support his bald conclusion, the Assessor simply reasserts more
unsubstantiated conclusions that, in his view, the Settlement Agreement does not bind
him. Such is not marshaling the evidence by any conceivable stretch.
Besides his failure to marshal the evidence, the Assessor's brief makes a number
of misstatements and arguments. Alliant will address each in turn.
The first argument the Assessor advances is that inasmuch as the Settlement
Agreement was negotiated and consummated between Alliant and the Board, it cannot
cover and bind the Assessor. The Assessor claims, "the settlement counteroffer was
issued by the BOE, and not by 'Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys.'" Assessor's
Brief at 43. Apparently, the Assessor wants the Court to draw the inference that because
Alliant and the Board negotiated the Settlement Agreement, its terms and obligations
cannot bind "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys." This inference can only be
valid if one ignores or distorts the ratification/approval of the Settlement Agreement by
the Salt Lake County Commission at the public hearing conducted December 6, 2000.
See Findings of Fact, % 11, R. 002876, Appendix B. Following the Salt Lake County
Commission's ratification/approval of the Settlement Agreement, and consistent with the
Commission's statutorily vested prerogative as the County's duly elected and constituted
legislative and executive body, the agreement bound and binds "Salt Lake County, its
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officers and attorneys," which necessarily includes the Assessor as an officer of the
County. See Findings of Fact 1 31, R. 002873, Appendix B.
The next argument the Assessor advances is that he cannot be bound by the
Settlement Agreement because he "was deliberately 'kicked out' of settlement
discussions and never participated in its terms." Assessor's Brief at 43. Having not
participated in the deliberations, the Assessor argues he was not a party to and cannot be
bound under the Settlement Agreement. But as the Tax Court found, this argument is
flawed in many respects. One, the Settlement Agreement bound "Salt Lake County, its
officers and attorneys" when the Salt Lake County Commission ratified it on December
6, 2000, as discussed above.

Two, the Assessor's own admissions describing his

opposition to the Settlement Agreement contradict his claim that he had no input in the
settlement negotiations.14 Put differently, the Assessor's arguments cannot be reconciled
with his actions and the facts. The Assessor himself communicated his protestations to
Board members at several phases of their deliberations, as well as at the public meeting
before the Salt Lake County Commission on December 6, 2000. Despite his protests, the
Assessor lost the debate. The decision-making bodies—the Board and the Salt Lake

14

In the Affidavit of Lee Gardner dated February 28, 2001 [R. 001743], the Assessor
states that (1) he attended a meeting on September 18, 2000 with representatives of the
Board of Equalization and others to discuss settlement with Alliant and he expressed his
objections to settlement and the inequities he thought it would create. Id f 3,4; (2) he
provided at least two letters to each Board member and others formally voicing his
concerns and objections about efforts of settlement. Idf 2,5; and (3) he appeared at and
voiced his concerns and objections to the Settlement Agreement in the public Salt Lake
County Commission meeting held December 6, 2000. Id.fl.
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County Commission—twice rejected the Assessor's arguments when they adopted and
approved the Settlement Agreement, despite the Assessor's repeated complaints.
The next argument the Assessor advances in seeking reversal of the attorneys' fees
award stems from a counteroffer of settlement Alliant wrote to the Board dated
November 30, 2000 [R. 001708], in which the concept of joint cooperation in good faith
was first proposed as a condition of settlement. Alliant there stated, "Salt Lake County,
its officers, attorneys and assessors, shall, in good faith and operating in concert with
Alliant" secure the approval of the Settlement Agreement. Letter from Maxwell A.
Miller to Karl Hendrickson (November 30, 2000); R. 001708. In the next iteration of the
settlement documents, the Settlement Agreement Mr. Hendrickson prepared on behalf of
the Board, which was the version it ultimately adopted, the word "assessors" was deleted.
Based upon that deletion, the Assessor claims he has a loophole through which to escape.
This argument is without merit. Alliant's original counteroffer dated November
30, 2000 used the words "officers, attorneys and assessors" as double coverage in an
effort to foreclose the County from attempting to dishonor the Settlement Agreement.
Alliant's intent in writing the November 30, 2000 letter is self-evident from the fact that
Salt Lake County has only one elected assessor, and one elected district attorney,
although the letter says "assessors," and "attorneys." More important, both the District
Attorney and the Assessor are statutorily defined as and admitted to be "officers" of the
County. The Assessor expressly admits he "is an independently elected County Official"
[Assessor's Brief at 47], obviously bringing him within the scope of those bound to seek
approval of the Settlement Agreement "in good faith." Clothed with apparent authority
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and speaking as an agent for his principals "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys,"
Mr. Karl L. Hendrickson, Deputy District Attorney, bound his principals to the
Settlement Agreement.15 The words in the Settlement Agreement, "Salt Lake County, its
officers and attorneys," mean precisely what they say and the Assessor is bound.
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 2001 UT 11 (the "plain language" of a stipulation will
control). It was precisely on that basis that the Tax Court found the Assessor to be a
"nominal party" to the Settlement Agreement, [Findings of Fact f l 18,31, R. 002875,
002873, Appendix B] and therefore had breached his obligations under the agreement by
refusing to honor it, and aggressively seeking its disapproval before the Tax Commission
and the Tax Court. See specifically Findings of Fact fj[ 16, 17, 18, 27 and 30, R. 002875,
002873, Appendix B. Most important, the Salt Lake County Commission expressly
ratified/approved the Settlement Agreement on December 6, 2000 thereby solidifying its
binding effect on "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys." Findings of Fact f 19,
R. 002874, Appendix B.
The Assessor's final argument is that if the Board had intended to include the
Assessor in the proposed settlement with Alliant, the Board's approval of the Settlement
Agreement would have exceeded the scope of its authority. Assessor's Brief at 47. In
support of this proposition, the Assessor cites several statutes and court decisions that
15

Basic agency law dictates that a principal (Mr. Gardner) is bound by the acts of an
agent clothed with apparent authority (Mr. Hendrickson). Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 8 (1958). In Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927), the Utah
Supreme Court stated: "It is a general principle of the law of agency that the principals
are bound by the acts of their agents which fall within the apparent scope of the authority
of the agents, and that the principals will not be permitted to deny the authority of their
agents against innocent third parties, who have dealt with those agents in good faith."
604432.2
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allow the Assessor appeal rights. Alliant agrees the Assessor is vested with appeal rights
as to certain Board actions, but the Assessor's conceded appeal rights to a Board decision
are completely irrelevant in an appropriate analysis of a County Commission contract.
The Assessor has asserted another non sequitur.
As explained in Section I above, the crux of this matter is the statutorily granted
power to the Salt Lake County Commission, as the duly constituted executive and
legislative body of the County, to settle protracted litigation involving the County, when,
in good faith, it believes such to be in the County's best interests. If not before, the
Settlement Agreement became binding on "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys"
when it was expressly ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County Commission on
December 6, 2000. Findings of Fact f 11, R. 002876. As the Tax Court noted "This fact
alone [adoption of Settlement Agreement by the County Commission] may cast this case
in a different posture than some case law cited as controlling." Tax Court Decision of
September 20, 2001 at 15, R. 001973, Appendix B.
Moreover, the Assessor has confused his "right of appeal" with a supposed "right
of veto," wrongly assuming the two are equivalent. The Assessor may have the right to
have the Board and the County Commission consider his opinion, but that does not mean
the reviewers must necessarily sanction and adopt the Assessor's views. As discussed in
footnote 10, the Assessor forcefully asserted his opinions to both the Board and the Salt
Lake County Commission, and yet notwithstanding the Assessor's expressed concerns,
each viewed settlement of litigation with Alliant to be in the County's best interests. See
specifically Notes of the Salt Lake County Commission meeting of December 6, 2000; R.
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001687, 001684. The simple reality of the situation is that the Assessor was unable to
persuade the Board and the Salt Lake County Commission that his opinion was correct
and in the County's best interests.
CONCLUSION
This is an easy case for affirmance. The fundamental issue is whether explicit
language in the Utah Code vesting the Salt Lake County Commission with authority to
settle unliquidated claims in "all lawsuits and other actions" should have a judicially
inferred exception for property tax litigation. Appellants' briefs and that of the Tax
Commission invite this Court to invent case law, and disregard statutory law, as if there
were no law. The Tax Commission, for instance, wants this Court, not the legislature, to
establish procedures for settlement of property tax cases in the face of explicit statutory
authority to the contrary. Appellants want the Court to invalidate settlement procedures
for property tax litigation that have been successfully used in hundreds of cases for many
years. If Appellants have their way, property tax settlements, which invariably are
compromises between competing claims of fair market value, will rarely be achieved.
Salt Lake County's present refusal to honor the Settlement Agreement remains a
mystery, especially in light of voluminous case law imposing a duty of "good faith and
fair dealing" upon contracting parties. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co.,
2004 UT 34, f 27 (Good faith and fair dealing is the parties' expectation in a contractual
relationship.). To this day, there is absolutely no legal impediment stopping Salt Lake
County from keeping its word, honoring the Settlement Agreement and paying Alliant
the refund it agreed to pay. Were Salt Lake County to honor its commitment, this case
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would then be moot. Yet whatever reasons may exist for the County's so-called "benign
neutrality," as the Tax Court termed the County's attempt "to invalidate and reject its
own detailed [contractual] language," it is inarguable that "Salt Lake County, its officers
and attorneys" have made no attempt "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" to
secure approval of the Settlement Agreement, as the County and County officials
promised they would. Despite such breach of contract, it is nonetheless apodictic that
Salt Lake County District Attorney David Yocom was correct in declaring on December
6, 2000 in a public meeting on the Settlement Agreement, "there [is] no question that the
[County] Commission has the ultimate authority to control litigation and to determine
what settlement amounts should be offered." Mr. Yocom's admission recognizes, as did
Tax Court Judge Lynn W. Davis, that Utah statutes confer plenary authority on the
County Executive to settle "all lawsuits and other actions" including property tax
litigation. The Settlement Agreement is "legal, enforceable and constitutional," just as
Judge Davis held. The Tax Court should be affirmed.
DATED this ^

day of July, 2004

IAXWELL A. MILLER
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Alliant Techsystems,
Inc.
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The Board has requested me to communicate a final settlement counteroffer to you to be
presented to your client. The Board's offer of settlement is for tax years 1995 through 1999,
inclusive, and is in the amount of 55 Million dollars. That settlement number includes all claims
in all outstanding actions for those tax years involving real and personal property, NTROP. and is
inclusive of all interest, both that accruing prior to the issuance of the judgments or orders and
that accruing after the issuance of the judgments or orders through the date of final payment.
fn proposing a setdement amount of S5 Million dollars, the Board specifically makes this
a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for the years 1995-1999 inclusive. No
obsolescence percentage or amount will be applied to any particular year under appeal and any
allocation of a reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with respect to any issue raised in
Affiant's appeals. Specificalfy included within that category are claims as to excessive or
extraordinary functional pbsolescence, economic or external obsolescence, environmental
contamination and remediation, and any stigma associated therewith. With respect to the
personal property inclusion within the settlement amount, acceptance of the settlement shall
include all issues which have been asserted with respect to personal property, including but not
limited to existence or non-existence of items of property, extraordinary functional obsolescence
economic or external obsolescence associated with production equipment and unresolved issues
related to previously filed personal property affidavits by Alliant and audits performed by Salt
Lake County. This settlement proposal is subject to execution of a settlement agreement and
stipulation incorporating the terms hereof, final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and
the District Court and entiy of appropriate judgments and orders sufficient to authorize Salt Lake
SOUTH STATE STREET, S3600

SALT LAKE C1TY, UTAH 84190-1200 TELEPHONE(801) 468-3420 FAX (801) 468-2646

:. t\ 1 „; a 1

Maxwell A. Miller
December 5, 2000
Page 2

County and the affected taxing entities within Salt Lake County to recover^11 refunds paid
through the imposition of an appropriate judgment levy Payment of the refund, at the taxing
entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of
the judgment levy.
This settlement shall be deemed by the parties to be a litigation settlement of disputed
claims. To that end, in the event the settlement is not accepted, none of the communications nor
correspondence relating to the settlement shall be introduced or produced by any party nor shall
they be deemed admissible including by reference or inclusion in the pleadings of the parties in
any proceeding relating to the matters in dispute or any subsequent proceeding involving Alliant
or Alliant's successors in interest In the event the settlement is accepted, the prohibition against
production, introduction, or admissibility in any proceeding shall extend to any and all
correspondence, communications relating to the settlement proposal, the settlement adoption and
the actual settlement documents themselves, including therein pleadings, orders and judgments
except as may be required to enforce the terms of the settlement
Unless prohibited by an order entered in the intervention proceedings, the settlement
agreement and the stipulation shall be signed and filed with the Third District Court and the Utah
State Tax Commission, as the case may be, no later than December 15, 2000. Payment of the
refund, at each taxing entity's option, will be made either from current cash flows and reserves or
from the proceeds of the judgment levy no later than December 31, 2001.
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in concert with
Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third District Court and the Utah State
Tax Commission approving the settlement agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious
manner.
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching
party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement.
Sincerely,

-f

/

KARL L. HENDRJCKSON
Deputy District Attorney
Tax & Revenue Unit Chief
Telephone: (801)468-2657
pc: David Yoconi
Mark Shurtleff
Brent Overson
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Equalization, 1995-1999 real property and personal property tax
litigation
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Fourth Judicial ^ t r f Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
Deputy
RANDY M. GRMSHAW (1259)
MAXWELL A. MILLER (2264)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE TAX COURT DIVISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

,rd

3™ Dist Civil No. 980901298
(1995-1996 valuation tax years)

Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.
****************************************

VLLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
ALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
QUALIZATION and the UTAH STATE
AX COMMISSION,
1867.1

3rd Dist Civil No. 010908307
(1997-1999 valuation tax years)

Defendants,
and
LEE GARDNER, and GRANITE SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.

****************************************

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER
in his official capacity as SALT LAKE
COUNTYASSESSOR; LARRY
RICHARDSON in his official capacity as
SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER;
MARY CALLAGHAN, RANDY
HORIUCHI, and BRENT OVERSON, in
their official capacities as the SALT LAKE
COUNTY COMMISSION, and the SALT
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,

<tfa

4l" Dist. Civil No. 990402607
(Independent Action)

Defendants.
vs.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Intervenors

Honorable Lynn W. Davis

On December 5, 2000, Plaintiff Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant"), and Defendants
Salt Lake County, its officers and assessors, entered into a written stipulation in settlement of the
above-captioned matter. The Salt Lake County Commission approved the Settlement Agreement
on December 6, 2000, and on December 15, 2000 parties to the Settlement Agreement filed a
Stipulation for Settlement and Joint Motion for Approval and Entry of an Order Approving
Settlement ("Joint Motion") with this Court.
The parties in the above-captioned matter, including Defendants-Intervenors Lee
Gardner, Utah State Tax Commission, and Granite School District (collectively "Defendants")
subsequently filed their respective memoranda stating their positions on the Joint Motion. On
March 13, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on the Joint Motion.
Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel for the respective parties, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision"
("Decision") dated September 20,2001 with respect to the Joint Motion.
On June 7,2002, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision in which it considered:
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its Decision
That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement;
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement;
3. Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and consideration of
Plaintiffs [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and
u u *s
mei.x

4. The Award of Attorneys' Fees.
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 7, 2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint

Motion for Approval of Settlement.
2.

The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23, 2001 through April 27,

2001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through
1999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was
$215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively.
3.

On September 21, 2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third

District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 of the Tax
Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsystems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
County, et aL Appeal Nos. 98-0452, 98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the
County's assessments of Alliant5s real property for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (the "19971999 Valuation Case")- Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as
a Tax Court Judge.
4.

Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry

dated October 9, 2001.
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5.

The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian,

sitting as a Tax Court Judge.
6.

Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case

was Alliant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated
"Tax Court Judge'* in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts.
7.

Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court.

No less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending
before the Court. The first of the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed
February 6, 1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick (980901298). This first
case was termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," and involves Alliant's statutory and
constitutional challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates
under the direction and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve
Ordnance Plant or "NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, 1999 and future years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI of the United States
Constitution.
8.

There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP

Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis.
9.

The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et al., cases are appeals that

either Salt Lake County ot Mliaot filed ftom a Fmal Decision the Utah State T&K Commi^ioa
UUL6 / /

("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's
1995 and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case").
The Clerk of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996
Valuation Case respectively to Judges Nehring (990912695), Hanson (00090065 AA), Lewis
(00901301), Medley (000901449 AA), and Memmott 00070001). Again with agreement from
all parties, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to the Honorable
Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the Independent or NIROP
Action.
10.

By Order dated on November 6, 2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 1997-

1999 Valuation Case to this Court.
11.

On December 5, 2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant

entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000,
the Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly elected legislative body, adopted and
approved the Settlement Agreement.
12.

On September 27, 2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary

Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive.
13.

As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are

all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property

tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action,
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax
matters have been dismissed.
14.

Parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the agreement while some

matters covered by the Settlement Agreement, specifically property tax disputes involving
Alliant and some of the Defendants, were pending before this Tax Court and the Tax
Commission. Decision at 12.
15.

The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the Tax

Commission and this Court. Decision at 13.
16.

Prior to the formalization and approval of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or

proposal was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as parties to
the action. While the Settlement Agreement deletes the word "Assessors," as approved and
executed, it states that Salt Lake County, and its "officers" are parties to the Settlement
Agreement Decisional 15.
17.

The executed Settlement Agreement bears the signature of Karl Hendrickson,

Deputy District Attorney for and on behalf of Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, and
the signature of Maxwell Miller for and on behalf of Alliant. The Settlement Agreement was an
offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties to the Settlement Agreement,
Decisional 15.
18.

Defendant Lee Gardner, as the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor, is an

officer of Salt Lake County and a nominal party to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 15.
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19.

The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization in extending and

agreeing to the Settlement Agreement were ratified/approved by the Salt Lake County
Commission. Decision at 15.
20.

In reaching settlement, consideration was given to the risk of liability to Salt Lake

County and taxing entities within Salt Lake County, together with the costs and trouble of
protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion relative
to the merits of the respective claims. Decision at 16.
21.

The Settlement Agreement was drafted by Salt Lake County, which later

attempted to invalidate and reject its own detailed language based upon statutory, constitutional
and pragmatic arguments. Decision at 16.
22.

There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties

to the Settlement Agreement. Decision at 16.
23.

There is no evidence that the parties to the Settlement Agreement entered into the

agreement based upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage,
injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy. Decision at 16.
24.

This Settlement Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board

of Equalization and then was adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission.

25.

The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon

fair market value. Decision at 17.

26.

The Settlement Agreement does not address the divisibility/severability of the $5

million dollar settlement amount to separate years. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple
tax years and multiple jurisdictions. Decision at 17.
27.

The Settlement Agreement binds "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys,"

who, "in good faith and acting in concert with Alliant" shall "seek to secure an appropriate order
from the Third District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner." Decision at 22.
28.

The Settlement Agreement further provides that "In the event any party breaches

the foregoing conditions of settlement, the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or
costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement." Decision at 22.
29.

The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization did not affirmatively seek to secure

approval of the Settlement Agreement, nor did it object to approval of the Settlement Agreement;
instead it acted in "benign neutrality" with respect to the approval process. Decision at 23.
30.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his role of Salt Lake County Assessor, advocated the

defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invited the Court to void the agreement on a variety of
statutory, factual and constitutional grounds, which the Court rejects. Decision at 23.
31.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, is a party

to the Settlement Agreement because he is, at least nominally, an "officer" of Salt Lake County.
Decision at 23.
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32.

Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, breached

the Settlement Agreement by seeking to defeat the Settlement Agreement rather than seeking to
secure its approval. Decision at 23.
33.

Other Defendants who are not parties to the Settlement Agreement are not bound

by the attorneys' fee provision of the Settlement Agreement, Decision at 23.
34.

While the Settlement Agreement is a blanket settlement for all property tax

disputes between the parties for 1995 through 1999 either pending before this Court or before the
Tax Commission, the Settlement Agreement did not address future valuations. Decision at 23.
35.

The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's

assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or
NIROP actions seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the
years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years.

In addition, the Complaint also requests

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having taxed Alhant in violation of Article
VI of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years
1995-1999, clearly including the NEROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover
future years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued
unlawful assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of the NIROP claims are expressly covered
by the Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never
addressed in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement
NIROP claims. The NIROP claims are separate from the other related valuation cases.

36.

The Settlement Agreement was negotiated and entered into in good faith and

anticipated a refund of $5 million to Ailiant. Decision at 24.
37.

The intent of the parties to settle its property tax disputes arising from 1995

through 1999 inclusive is unequivocal. Decision at 24.
38.

The Tax Commission's rejection of the Settlement Agreement did not focus on

constitutional difficulties and problematic implementation of the Settlement Agreement, but
primarily upon the Settlement Agreement's failure to include a potential intervenor. Decision at
13.
39.

The Tax Commission's factual basis for rejecting the Settlement Agreement does

not exist here because an intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to
intervene has been filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. Decision at 13. Defendant
Granite School District filed its Motion to Intervene on December 7, 2000, whereas the Salt Lake
County Commission ratified the Settlement Agreement on December 6, 2000.
40.

Alliant's request for attorneys' fees is reasonable and appropriate in the amount of

$30,000.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now therefore enters its

UUCOt*
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Settlement Agreement is enforceable, legal and constitutional. Decision at

2.

The Court rejects Defendants' constitutional challenges to the Settlement

2L

Agreement, specifically including Defendants' arguments that the Settlement Agreement is
unconstitutional because it does not assign an assessed value to the property at issue based upon
fair market value. Decision at 21.
3.

The Court rejects the Tax Commission's objection to the Settlement Agreement

that the Tax Commission and/or Granite School District are necessary parties to the Settlement
Agreement. Granite School District was not a necessary party to the Settlement Agreement and
its absence as a party to the agreement does not make the Settlement Agreement unenforceable.
Decision at 24.
4.

When the Court issued its Decision, jurisdiction to approve the Settlement

Agreement was divided between this Court and the Tax Commission. This Court had partial
jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement in that jurisdiction was then shared between
this Court and the Tax Commission. Decision at 22.
5.

While jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement was divisible between the

Tax Commission and the Court, the refund award to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years. Decision at 22.
6.

The refund amount of $5 million to Alliant under the Settlement Agreement is

indivisible and non-allocable between the various tax years. Decision at 25.

uu^o/t)

7.

The sole reason the Court initially declined to enforce the Settlement Agreement

is that the Court's jurisdiction and the Tax Commission's jurisdiction over the years 1995
through 1999 at issue under the Settlement Agreement were divisible. Decision at 25.
8.

The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and has authority to

resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. Decision at 16.
9.

Alliant is entitled to attorneys5 fees to be assessed against Defendant Lee Gardner,

in his official capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, because Mr. Gardner breached the
Settlement Agreement in not seeking to secure approval of the Settlement Agreement. Decision
at 24 and 25.
10.

The Court has entertained, considered and rejected Defendants' arguments against

the Settlement Agreement and its enforcement, which include:
10.1

At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the
opportunity to fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property
uniformly and equally based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-302 and
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102, as amended;

10.2

The Settlement Agreement address but does not set or fix values
based upon fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value
violates Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102
and Utah Const. Art. Xm, sec. 2.

10.3

Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its
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face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive
because the "conditional language" of the agreement is plain and
clear;
10.4

The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the
Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible.

The

Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with
differing jurisdictions;
10.5

There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the
$5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years; allocation
would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and further, if the
tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare;

10.6

The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple
jurisdictions;

10.7

The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the
Settlement Agreement;

10.8

The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement
Agreement is that the terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust
and the Agreement entirely ignores uniform and equal taxation
statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally

flawed because there is no attempt to achieve fair market value.
Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be achieved.
10.9

The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases.

10.10

The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement
Agreement.

10.11

Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to
reject the Settlement Agreement.

10.12

The Settlement Agreement cannot be implemented in its current
form because it fails to reflect fair market value assessments.

Decision at 17-18.
11.

This Court is not bound by the Tax Commission's decision of rejection of the

Settlement Agreement. Decision at 13.
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters its
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ORDER
Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend is hereby granted and the Court enforces the Settlement
Agreement in its entirety. Judgment is hereby entered against Salt Lake County and in favor of
AUiant for $5 million. The Court awards attorneys' fees to Alliant Techsystems, Inc., against
Defendant Lee Gardner, in his capacity as Salt Lake County Assessor, in the amount of $30,000.
DATED this JO day of June 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Jr_ day of June, 2003,1 caused to be sent, via U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER ON JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT, to:
J. Craig Smith
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC
60 East South Temple, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Kelly W. Wright
P.O. Box 886
Morgan, UT 84050
JohnE. S.Robson
David Pearce
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210
Mary Ellen Sloan
2001 South State St., S 3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Bill Thomas Peters
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters
185 South State St., Ste. 700
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

TAX COURT DECISION
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 990402607
DATE: SEPTEMBER 19,2001
!

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN,
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,
Defendants.

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
CLERK: SGJ

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Randy M Grimshaw
Maxwell A. Miller

Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

John McCarry, Assistant Attorney General
Michelle Snow, Assistant Attorney General

Utah State Tax Commission

Bill Thomas Peters
Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake District
Attorney

Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry
Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy
Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County
Commission at the Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Summary Judgment stage
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J. Craig Smith

Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board
of Equalization at the Motion to Approve
Settlement Stage

Kelly Wright

Salt Lake County Assessor

John E. S. Robson

Granite School District

There are now pending before the Court various motions from both sides. Rulings on
various motions have been stayed because of Alliant's Motion for Approval of Settlement which
was filed on or about March 1,200 L
This Court will attempt to outline the legal arguments gleaned from oral argument,
memoranda and various reply briefs of each^party. Please consider the following:
PENDING MOTION #1
ALLIANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED AUGUST 24,1999
The motion was "limited to defendants' unlawful taxation of NIROP property, and to
claims related to that unlawful taxation." AUiant alleges that "because the federal government, in
this instance the United States Navy, and not plaintiff, has and exercises the most significant
incidents of ownership over its NIROP real and personal property which plaintiff manages under
contract with the United States Navy, such property is immune from assessment and taxation by
defendant Salt Lake County and/or any of its subdivisions under Article VI of the United States
Constitution." (See generally Alliant's Motion to Supplement Record With After-Acquired
Testimony.)
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PENDING MOTION #2
TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED JUNE 1,2000
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

TAX COMMISSION

(ARGUMENTS taken from Tax Commission's Reply
Memo in Support for Motion for Summary Judgment 6-12000)
POINT ONE: Alliant is not exempt from the Utah privilege
tax, UCA § 59-4-101
* Alliant claims an exemption from the privilege
tax under UCA 59-4-10 l(3)(e) which exempts
"the use or possession of any lease, permit, or
easement unless the lease, permit, or easement
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive
possession of the premises to which the lease,
permit, or easement relates..,"
L Tax Commission argues Alliant has not
pled, nor can it show, that it uses NIROP
pursuant to any "lease, permit or easement"
2. Alliant cannot show that its use of
NIROP is not "exclusive."
3. Alliant must prove it is exempt which it
has not done.
4. The exemption statute must be construed
strictly against the taxpayer (Newspaper
Agency Corp. v. Auditing Division. 938 P.2d
266,270 (Utah, 1997).
** "Even if the Court construes Alliant's contract to be a
"lease, permit or easement," the Court must reject Alliant's
argument for exemption."
1. Alliant argues "exclusive possession" as used in
the statute, must be interpreted to mean that the
possession is exclusive of everyone, including the
owner. The Tax Commission argues "exclusive
possession" must be read to mean that the possession
is exclusive of everyone but the owner or lessor. Tax
Commission directs the Court to Thiokol Chem.
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Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964) where
it states the intent of the statute is to Hclose the gap
in the tax laws by imposing a tax on any property
possessed or used in connection with a business for
profit which was otherwise exempt from taxation."
2. NIROP is the only contractor with a contract for
the use of NIROP.
3. NIROP is not open to the public, or other
contractors.
4. The Navy's (owner) exercise of its rights to the
property should not change the conclusion that
Alliant5 s possession of NIROP is exclusive.

POINT TWO: The privilege tax against Alliant does not
violate the Supremacy Clause.
1. Tax Commission argues that Alliant's
argument is that the privilege tax is
unconstitutional because it measures tax with
reference to the value of exempt property.
Commission argues this same argument was
rejected in U.S. v. City of Detroit 355, U.S. 466,
470. (See Reply Memo p. 6-7)
PENDING MOTION #3
TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

TAX COMMISSION

POINT ONE: The Utah Constitution and the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d
435 establish the limits of the district court's original
jurisdiction over tax matters.
POINT TWO: The Court lacks jurisdiction because
plaintiff must first exhaust its administrative remedies.
POINT THREE: Alliant is ban*ed by Res Judicata
*Tax Commission issued a final decision on the
taxability of NIROP and Alliant cannot thus bring
this original action.
POINT FOUR: Declaratory relief is barred where another
action is pending with the same issues.
-4-
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POINT FIVE: The Court should dismiss Alliant's section
1983 action because Alliant has an adequate remedy under
state law.
THE ASSESSOR, COUNTY COMMISSION, AND BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
SUPPORTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED JUNE 1,2000
ALLIANT

(The following arguments are taken from Alliant's Reply
'Memo addressing Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.)
POINT ONE: There is no constitutional bar to the
"independent" action.
-Creation of tax court certainly provides no
limitation on the rights taxpayers have had for
years to institute independent court proceedings
against erroneous, illegal and unlawful tax
assessments (see UCA §§ 59-1-301, 59-2-1321,
59-2-1326, 59-2-1327).
POINT TWO: The Tax Commission's final decision is not
res judicata in the "independent" proceeding on the taxation
ofNIROP.
1. Tax Commission's decision on NIROP dealt
primarily with valuation issues and secondarily
with the application of the privilege tax to NIROP
under Utah State Law. The Commission did not
address nor should it have, federal law issues,
which must be raised in an independent action.
2. Tax Commission decision was for 1995-96, the
"independent" action involves 1995-1999.
3. Certain causes of action in the "independent
proceeding are asserted under express statutory
provisions vesting jurisdiction in the district courts
to adjudicate taxes "deemed unlawful by the party
whose property is taxed." UCA 59-1-301, 59-21321, 59-2-1326 and 59-2-1327.
POINT THREE: Alliant may assert a claim under 42
U.S.C. §1983 (see Reply Memo, p. 6-11).
-5"" r * C ^ ^

POINT FOUR: Alliant is entitled to property and
privilege tax exemption under Utah Law, UCA § 59-4101(3) (fully quoted on p. 16 of the memo).
-Alliant's use of NIROP is not exclusive. It is
controlled and limited by the Navy.
POINT FIVE: Alliant does not assert the Supremacy
Clause.
-Alliant makes a fair apportionment argument
under the commerce clause. (Tax Commission
argues that the cases cited here by Alliant have
nothing to do with the commerce clause and must
fall under the Supremacy Clause). (Reply Memo
p. 24-29).
PENDING MOTION #4
ALLIANT'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT FILED MARCH 1,2001
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS,
INC.

-BROKERED SETTLEMENT
(Takenfromboth the Memorandum and Reply
Memorandum in Support of Settlement.)
-District Court has jurisdiction to approve Settlement.
a. "If the Court dismisses the NIROP action for
lack ofjurisdiction, the Court nonetheless can,
and should approve the SETTLEMENT
agreement in the "consolidated valuation cases."
By the terms of the Settlement Agreement, if
approved, there could be no appeal from a
dismissal of the NIROP action and the matter
would be moot." (p. 8 Reply Memo)
-Board of Equalization had authority to settle.
a. Board's power to settle comes from Utah
Const. Art. XIII, sec. 11(7) AND UCA 59-21000, and public policy favoring settlements.
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b. The Assessor's duty to assess fair market value
(59-2-302, 59-2-102) is not solely his. Board can
also assess fair market value (UCA 59-2-103(1),
and Utah Const. Art. XIII sec 2(1)).
c. Assessor's duty to assess property at fair
market value is constitutionally subordinate to the
Board's duty to equalize assessment. See Rio
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184
("Where it is impossible to achieve perfectly both
the standard of true value and the standard of
uniformity and equality, the latter standard should
prevail.")
d. Neither Assessor nor Granite has veto power
over the Board's ability to settle.
-Settlement Agreement binds Assessor.
a. Agreement states: "Salt Lake County, its
officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in
concert with Alliant
"
b. Alliant is entitled to attorney's fees against the
Assessor for having to compel him to honor the
agreement.
-Board of Equalization is bound by Settlement
a. New Board argues prior Board cannot enter
into a contract, which controls or limits the future
Board's actions. Alliant argues that the case
relied upon refers to the binding of "governmental
or legislative power" and breaching contracts
made in settlement is not a governmental power.
b. Government entity cannot repudiate its own
settlement offer.
-Court should approve the Settlement
a. UCA 59-20-1321 provides county legislative
body with the power to refund taxes, or lower
assessments.
b. Sufficient proof was given that wide
discrepancies existed between Alliant and the
Assessor. (See p. 11-26 discussing the prior
adjudicated decisions and the appraisals.)

-7-
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c. The Settlement Agreement contemplates that
this Court will enter an appropriate order lowering
Alliant's assessments and ensuring that the taxing
entities within Salt Lake County may recover
refunded taxes.
1. The language of the settlement calls for
"entry of appropriate judgments and orders
sufficient to authorize Salt Lake County and
the affecting taxing entities within Salt Lake
County to recover all refunds paid the
imposition of an appropriate judgment levy."
-"The prerogative to evaluate the risks and likely costs of
litigation and to choose or compromise between conflicting
appraisals" belongs to the Board of Equalization. Logan
City v. Allen. 44 P.2d 1085.
-Board of Equalization is authorized to "adjust and equalize
the valuation and assessment of real and personal property
within their respective counties." UCA §59-2-1000
SALT LAKE COUNTY
BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION

-BROKERED SETTLEMENT
(New Board is neutral to settlement)
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum to the Joint
Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement.")
-Board of Equalization changed its entire membership on
January 2, 2001.
-Remaining neutral the new Board argues that it is not
bound by the settlement
* government bodies "cannot make a contract
which is binding on the municipality after the
end of such governing body's term of office."
Bair v. Lavton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902
(Utah 1957).

SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR

-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.")
-8-
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-Argues Assessor is a necessary party for settlement.
(UCA §59-2-1001(5)).
* Assessor was not a party of the settlement.
* Assessor is not bound by the settlement.
-Argues the Court lacks jurisdiction over '97, '9$, '99.
•Settlement covers ' 97, '98, '99 issues (Tax
Commission has jurisdiction),
*And settlement covers '95, '96 NIROP (Court
has jurisdiction).
-Argues NIROP issue res judicata.
*Tax Commission found NIROP property
lawfully taxable subject to UCA §59-4-101 in
November 1998.
-Argues settlement invalid because it does not address
valuation.
*Fair Market Value not addressed: this violates
UCA §59-2-301, UCA 59-2-102 and Utah
Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 2.
-Argues Board of Equalization lacks the power to broker
the settlement.
*UCA §59-2-1347 allows "county legislative
body" to refund taxes and Board of Equalization
is not the legislative body.
*The mere possibility of losing the litigation
does not justify ignoring constitutional and
statutory mandates.
-Argues ("Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion
for Approval of Settlement") that the Assessor is legally
bound to assess all property uniformly and equal based on
"fair market value." UCA §59-2-301, 59-2-102.
-Assessor has a statutory right to appeal the decisions of
the Board of Equalization. UCA §59-2-1006(1).

JTAH STATE TAX
:OMMISSION

-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion to Approve Settlement.")
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-COURT LACKS JURISDICTION (refers the Court to
Assessor's Memorandum at p. 16-17).
-Court must ignore issues of valuation methodology (p. 34).
-March 7,2001 the Tax Commission denied the proposed
settlementfindingas follows:
1. Granite petitioned to intervene 11-17-2000.
2. Alliant and Commission knew Granite
petitioned to intervene and requested to be a
party in the resolution.
3. Granite was a necessary party to any
settlement as of 11-17-2000.
4. Approval of the settlement "would require a
necessary party that had moved to intervene
prior to the stipulated settlement to accept such
a settlement against its will."
GRANITE SCHOOL
DISTRICT

-OPPOSES SETTLEMENT
(Arguments taken from "Reply Memorandum in
Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement.")
-Board of Equalization lacks the authority to make a
settlement that ignores fair market value.
-Utah Constitution requires all property to be taxed
uniformly and equally.
-Settlement is not in the best interests of the County.
PENDING MOTION #5

ALLIANT'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD WITH
AFTER-ACQUIRED TESTIMONY FILED JULY 30,2001
This motion has been dealt with separately by the Court
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PENDING MOTION #6
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
FILED MARCH 12,2001
Assessor argues that any attempt to include valuation testimony at this point is beyond
the scope of settlement
This motion has been dealt with separately by the Court.
I.
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
The creation of a tax court by statute is of recent vintage. This Court's authority is
governed by law and the Constitution. The Court must analyze its authority carefully. Consider:
As argued by defendants,
As a general rule, "parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to seeking judicial review," State Tax Commission v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524
(Utah 1989).
As argued by plaintiff,
A duly constituted tax court in the State of Utah has jurisdiction to decide whether
Salt Lake County's imposition of a privilege tax violates state or federal law or both. Bluth v.
Tax Commission, 2001 Ut App 138, 420 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Ct App. 2001) 2001 Utah App.
Lexis 35). This Court is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari. In
addition the Court may consider whether injunctive/declaratory relief is exclusively within the
province of the Court, as opposed to the Utah State Tax Commission.
Next, the Court must also consider in the statutory/constitutional mix, the fact that these
parties have entered into a settlement agreement which contains specific language requiring a
district court approval. Certainly, while jurisdiction cannot be stipulated to, the parties have
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agreed procedurally to have a district court review and either approve or disapprove of the
settlement.
It seems to this Court that should the Court disapprove and reject the Settlement
Agreement, then it must return and carefully rule on the pending Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, and other motions. Should this Court approve the settlement, then
most of the issues and arguments of the parties are moot.

II.
SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
An agreement was entered into by the litigants or their attorneys while matters were
pending both before the Utah State Tax Commission and this Tax Court. As addressed above,
the parties may not by stipulation invest a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
cause which it would not otherwise have had. The parties understood this basic concept and
required approval by the Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Court/District Court.
A court should give stipulations or agreements of the parties a "fair and liberal
construction, consistent with the apparent intention of the parties, the spirit of justice, and the
futherance of fair trials upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one calculated to
defeat the purpose of their making." (See generally 73 Am Jur 2nd §§ 7, 541.) While courts
generally look upon stipulated settlements with favor, legitimate judicial scrutiny is necessary.
The Court, in a settlement agreement, ought to look at thfe circumstances surrounding the parties
at the time of making, ought to look for internal language and term consistency, ought to examine
whether the result is against public policy, and whether the agreed upon result is
constitutionally/statutorily sanctioned. Relief from a settlement agreement may be granted due to
constitutional impairment.
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A.
Is This Court Barred by the Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission?
The Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the State Tax
Commission and the District Court. It was brought to this Court's attention the day before oral
argument that the State Tax Commission rejected the Settlement Agreement. Is the Settlement
Agreement simply null and void? Is the Court bound by that decision, even if this Court
determines the controlling facts to be distinguishable? This Judge is of the opinion that the Tax
Court is not bound by the decision of rejection by the Utah State Tax Commission. Had the Tax
Commission focused on constitutional deficiencies and problematic implementation of the
agreement, this Court would have taken clear notice and given in-depth scrutiny to the reasoning.
But the Commission seemed to base its decision primarily on the failure of the settlement to
include a potential intervenor. (See paragraphs 1 - 4 of the State Tax Commission decision.) As
emphasized below, the factual basis relied upon by the Tax Commission does not exist here. A
motioned intervenor does not become a party to an action until the motion to intervene has been
filed, briefed, noticed, argued and ruled upon. If a county commission must include not only the
litigants, but also a representative from every conceivable taxing entity in a settlement agreement,
then, as pointed out by plaintiff, a Mosquito Abatement District could hold the litigants hostage.1
It is a matter of record in this Court that the Board of Education of Granite School
District faxed a copy of its Motion to Intervene under Rule 24 (a) on December 7, 2000 and filed

*Of course this Court recognizes that the Granite School District has a far greater interest in this dispute
than other taxing entities. If the State Tax Commission "Order on Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement" is
accurate, the "Granite School District is the single largest recipient of the property tax revenue that was the subject
of the dispute and would be responsible for approximately fifty percent of the refund, or about $2.5 million." (See
Order at paragraph 13, page 3 attached to Utah State Tax Commission's Reply Memorandum in Opposition to the
Motion to Approve Settlement)
Query: If a taxing entity, even a major stakeholder, is entitled to be a party to a settlement agreement and
has the power to defeat an agreement, and the matter is thereafter heard on the merits, and the "refund" far exceeds
the stipulated refund, then what? Can other taxing entities look to the intervenor for relief?
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an original on January 8, 2001. If counsel for Alliant is accurate, the stipulated settlement
agreement was entered into on December 5, 2000 and was approved by the Salt Lake County
Commission on December 6, 2000. It is clear that there wasn't even a faxed copy of a motion to
intervene on file with this Court at the time of the settlement. If the motion did not precede the
County Commission action, then this Court cannot give any weight to a potential filing of a
potential intervenor who potentially might become a future party to the action.2 Having said all of
this, this Court admits ignorance as to Granite School District's status, if any, in any pending
matters before the Utah State Tax Commission. From the Utah State Tax Commission decision it
appears that a motion to intervene may have been filed as early as November 17, 2000 in those
matters.
This Court is charged with the duty to independently review the settlement agreement
and clearly the circumstances surrounding intervention before the Utah State Tax Commission
were not extant before this Court. As argued by Alliant, the "factual basis upon which the Tax
Commission entirely rested its decision is not present here. There was no motion to intervene
before the settlement agreement was consummated." It is the opinion of this Court that the ruling
of the Utah State Tax Commission does not preclude this Court from independently examining
the Settlement Agreement.
C
Is the Settlement Agreement Defeated by the Salt Lake tountv Assessor's
Claim that He is Not a Party to the Settlement Agreement?

2

Granite School District did not rely upon a "necessary party" theory before this Court. Granite makes no
mention of this theory in its "Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement" or at
oral argument on the motion to approve settlement. Granite focused on the Board of Equalization's lack of
authority to enter into a settlement that ignores fair market value, the constitutional defects of the settlement
because it ignores requirements that all property be taxed uniformly and equally, and the fact that settlement is not
in the best interests of the County. In addition Granite does rely on the totality of the Tax Commission decision
which would arguably bar this Court from approving the settlement; there is nothing to approve.
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Prior to the adoption of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or proposal was circulated
that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc. as the parties to the action. The
"assessors" language was stricken out. The Settlement Agreement which was agreed to indicates
"Salt Lake County, its officers," etc.
That agreement/letter, agreed to and adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County
Commission bears the signature of Karl Hendriksen, Deputy District Attorney. It was an offer of
settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the parties. No one can contend that the duly
elected Salt Lake County Assessor is not an officer of Salt Lake County. He is. He is a nominal
party to the Settlement Agreement.
This Court appreciates the unique duties and role of a county assessor. A county
assessor has statutory charges which frequently place him/her at odds with the decisions of a
board of equalization. The assessor necessarily "checks" the decisions of the board and the
assessor may appeal decisions of the Board of Equalization on various grounds. Nonetheless, the
Court finds that the Salt Lake County Assessor, as an officer of Salt Lake County, is a nominal
party to the settlement agreement. The Salt Lake County Commission has authority to legally
bind the County and its officers.
D.
The Settlement Agreement - What Do We Know About This Settlement
Agreement Which Would Surest Approval, Validity and Enforceability
by This Court?
Consider:
1. The Settlement Agreement was reduced to writing;
2. The parties were present and/or represented by legal counsel;
3. The actions of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization were ratified/approved
by the Salt Lake County Commission; (This fact alone may cast this case in a different posture
than some case law cited as controlling.)
-15-
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4. There was a consideration of the risk of liability together with the costs and trouble
of protracted litigation, a review of depositions and appraisals, and at least some discussion
relative to the merits of the respective claims.
5. The terms and conditions are fairly detailed;
6. No party was misled, deceived or defrauded in the process;
7. The Agreement does not dictate how a court should resolve questions of law;
8. The purpose and clear intent of the parties to settle is unequivocable;
9. The Settlement Agreement/letter was drafted by Salt Lake County, who now
attempts to invalidate and reject its own detailed language on statutory, constitutional and
pragmatic grounds;
10. There is no evidence of repudiation, retraction or withdrawal by any of the parties
to the Settlement Agreement;
11. The Agreement does not divest the Court of jurisdiction;
12. There is no evidence that these parties entered into the Settlement Agreement based
upon inadvertence, improvidence, excusable neglect, inequity, disadvantage, injustice, overreaching, or against sound public policy.
13. The Salt Lake County Commission is a legislative body and certainly has authority
to resolve, compromise and settle lawsuits during pending litigation. This Settlement Agreement
was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and then was
adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission. As a general rule, a court ought not to
substitute its judgment for that of duly elected officials. Either this Settlement Agreement was
entered into in good faith, or it was an absolute sham. Whether this Court likes the result, agrees
with the methodology, believes the amount of the settlement to be fair, is of absolutely no
consequence.
E.
Deficiencies of the Settlement Agreement
-16-

Though the intent of the parties is patently clear, the deficiencies are likewise clear.
Consider:
1. At least initially, the Salt Lake County Assessor does not have the opportunity to
fulfill his statutory duties to assess all property uniformly and equally based upon UCA §59-2-302
and UCA §59-2-102,1953, as amended;
2. The Settlement Agreement addresses but does not set or fix valuations based upon
fair market value; Failure to address Fair Market Value violates UCA §59-2-301, UCA 59-2-102
and Utah Const Art. XIII, Sec. 2.
3. Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax Commission the Settlement
Agreement must be defeated on its face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive
because the "conditional language" of the agreement plain and clear;
4. The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in the Settlement
Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated
resolution for five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with differing
jurisdictions.
5. There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to allocate the $5 million dollar
settlement amount to separate years; allocation would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions
and further, if the tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment nightmare;
6. The Settlement Agreement spans multiple tax years and multiple jurisdictions;
7. The Court lacks any jurisdiction, regardless of the language of the Settlement
Agreement;
8. The overriding concern of those who object to the Settlement Agreement is that the
terms of the Agreement are manifestly unjust and the Agreement entirely ignores uniform and
equal taxation statutes and fair market value. The Agreement is fundamentally flawed because
there is no attempt to achieve fair market value. Uniformity, fairness and equality cannot be
achieved.
-17-
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9. The Board lacks plenary power to settle cases.
10. The Assessor is not a party to nor bound by the Settlement Agreement
11. Fundamental fairness and due process should compel the Court to reject the
Settlement Agreement.
12. The Settlement cannot be implemented in its current form because it fails to reflect
fair market value assessments.
III.
DECISION OPTIONS AND DISCUSSION
The difficulties in reaching a decision in this case are legion and rest first with the
jurisdictional challenges (NIROP), second with the Utah State Tax Commission disapproval of the
settlement agreement and the implications on this Court's decision, and third with severability
issues both as jurisdiction and the award. If the Court then factors in the position of the Salt Lake
County Assessor that he was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, and the merits of the
arguments of the other defendants, the permutations increase geometrically. The following
decisional permutations do not address and isolate the myriad of the legal or constitutional claims
for disapproval. Please consider:
Decision Options
Category

Possible Decisions

I, Conditional Settlement Agreement
This Court is simply barred from any
approval because of the rejection by the Utah
State Tax Commission and the conditional
language of the agreement. The Tax
Commission decision is dispositive. End of
inquiry!

1. Automatic disapproval.

Of course the obvious downside to the
automatic disapproval position is the fact
that the basis of the dispositive decision
-18-
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might turn out to be reversible error. Then
what?
Certainly any basis for rejection must be
legally sustainable. The Utah State Tax
Commission position should not paint this
Court into a corner of no escape. What if
the refund is not divisible, but the jurisdiction
clearly is?
If the Tax Court approves the settlement
and the Utah State Tax Commission rejects
it, but on non-sustainable grounds, or vice
versa, where does that leave the parties? Is a
divisibility of the refund award the only clear
legal option and solution until appellate
courts opine?

II. Global/Plenary Jurisdiction
The Court may determine pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, that it
has independent plenary jurisdiction. This
decision requires no severability of
jurisdiction or severability of the refund.
This decision places the Court decision
and Tax Commission decision on a collision
course in the appellate courts on
jurisdictional grounds.

2. Not approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
3. Not approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.
4. Approve Settlement - Award no attorney
fees.
5. Approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.

The Settlement Agreement contemplates
a resolution of all disputes between the
parties. Arguably, without even reaching the
merits of the Court's jurisdiction as to
NIROP, the Court could conclude that the
NIROP action is a pending action, and if the
$5 million Settlement Agreement is global,
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then it would include all claims including
NIROP and even those pending before the
Utah State Tax Commission. There is no
language in the Settlement Agreement that
would carve out or except out the NIROP
action.

III. Limited Jurisdiction
1995 & 1996 consolidated valuation
cases and NIROP where jurisdiction is
contested.
A decision in this category requires both
severability of jurisdiction and severability of
the refund in order to approve the Settlement
Agreement plus a decision favoring Alliant as
to the merits of the constitutional and
statutory arguments. A disapproval may be
reached either by the lack of authority to
sever the refund, or a ruling in favor of the
defendants on the merits of other arguments.

6. Not approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
7. Not approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.
8. Approve Settlement - Award no attorney
fees.
9. Approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.

A decision of this limited jurisdiction
including NIROP is contrary to the position
of some defendants and, again, would place
the Court's decision and the Tax
Commission decision in a collision course in
the appellate courts.
As addressed in Category II above, the
Settlement Agreement contemplates a
resolution of all disputes between the parties.
Arguably, without reaching the merits of
arguments respecting the Court's jurisdiction
as to NIROP, the Court could conclude that
the NIROP action is a pending-action, and if
the Court finds that it has plenary jurisdiction

u 61 S 6 8

over actions pending before it, then the
Court could include all claims including
NIROP. Again, if the Court finds that
jurisdction is severable, there is np language
in the Settlement Agreement that would
carve out or except out the NIROP action.

IV. Limited Jurisdiction II
1995 and 1996 consolidated valuation
cases only.

10. Not approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
11. Not approve Settlement - Award
attorney fees.

If this Court determines that it may
proceed on the 1995 and 1996 consolidated
valuation cases, in order to approve the
Settlement Agreement, then it must first
adopt a severability of jurisdiction theory,
and then a severability of refund theory, plus
make a decision favorable to Alliant as to the
merits of the constitutional and statutory
arguments. A disapproval may be reached
either by the lack of authority to sever the
amount of the refund, or a ruling in favor of
defendants on their arguments.

12. Approve Settlement - Award no
attorney fees.
13. Approve Settlement - Award attorney
fees.

There are at least thirteen different options or decisions available to this Court. It is
also entirely possible for the Court to adopt some hybrid.
As all parties are aware, the Court has labored over this decision. Each party should
know the reason why. It is the opinion of this Court that the Settlement Agreement entered into
by these parties is enforceable, legal and constitutional. The Court rejects the constitutional
challenges. But the difficulty with this decision is the ultimate fact that this Court does not believe
that the stated basis for the Utah State Tax Commission rejection decision, that of a "necessary
party theory," is sustainable as a matter of law.
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How does this Court then approve the Settlement Agreement when the Court is of the
view that the jurisdiction is non-intregrated and is, therefore, divisible, but the refund award is
global, indivisible and cannot be allocated between separate taxing years? What a dilemma!
Should the Court simply adopt a less preferable and less legally sustainable position of
refund divisibility? Or should this Court simply reject the legal settlement agreement because of
the Tax Commission rejection and concomitant impossibility of refund allocation? Can the Court
order allocation based upon the "good faith" requirements of the agreement?
With these issues in mind, the Court will discuss attorneys' fees, jurisdiction and finally
rule on the Motion to Approve the Settlement Agreement.
IV.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
The Settlement Agreement/letter provides for an award of attorneys' fees, in pertinent
part as follows:
Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys, in good faith and acting in
concert with Alliant shall seek to secure an appropriate order from the Third
District Court and the Utah State Tax Commission approving the settlement
agreement and the stipulation in an expeditious manner.
In the event any party breaches the foregoing conditions of settlement,
the non-breaching party is entitled to attorneys' fees or costs incurred in
enforcing the settlement agreement. (See Settlement of Outstanding Alliant
Tech Litigation, counter-offer letter dated December 5,2000 attached to
"Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Approve Settlement
and in Reply to the Assessor's Memorandum in Opposition to the Joint
Motion.)
Alliant requests attorneys' fees because the Salt Lake County Assessor, having filed a
memorandum in opposition to the joint motion has breached the condition of acting in good faith.
In addition, Alliant seeks attorneys' fees from the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
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because it did not, in concert with Alliant, seek to secure an appropriate order... approving the
Settlement Agreement before this Court.
This Court can best define the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization role in the
approval process as "benign neutrality." The Board did not, unlike other parties, object to the
approval of the Settlement Agreement. The court simply concludes that no attorneys' fees can be
awarded against the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
Next, the Court turns to the role of the Salt Lake County Assessor. This role is clear;
he is an advocate for defeat of the Settlement Agreement and invites the Court to void the
agreement on a variety of statutory, factual, and constitutional grounds. This Court has already
found that the Assessor is a party to the Settlement Agreement, at least nominally, as an "officer"
and was so bound by the Salt Lake County Commission.
The Assessor breached the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. It does not matter
who prevails on the motion. The award is independent of which side prevails. Alliant is entitled
to an award of attorneys' fees as may be established by affidavit.
Other parties to this action which oppose the Settlement were not parties to the
Settlement Agreement and not bound by the attorney fee provision.
V.
JURISDICTION
These parties agreed that $5 million would be refunded to Alliant to settle all cases
involving property tax disputes from 1995 to and including 1999. It was a blanket settlement
agreement, but, of course, it did not address future valuations.
Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission maintains jurisdction over some of those years
and this Court maintains jurisdiction over others. This Court has jurisdiction over the 1995 and
1996 consolidated valuation cases and the Utah State Tax Commission maintains jurisdiction over
the 1997, 1998 and 1999 real and personal property cases. It is also clear that the parties folly
recognized that tax matters involving Alliant were pending both before the Tax Court and the
-23uui

Utah State Tax Commission as of the date of the Settlement Agreement; December 7,2000. The
Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Court would have to rule independently. That just
makes sense.
The Utah State Tax Commission has no authority to approve a settlement with respect
to tax years 1995 and 1996 and this Court has no authority or jurisdiction to approve the
settlement for years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Both this Court and the Utah State Tax Commission
recognize jurisdictional limitations and both reject a global jurisdictional theory.
Next, this Court is of the opinion that the NIROP independent action falls outside the
scope of the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement. A 1983 civil rights cause of
action, together with other causes of action, does not fit into the post-filing Settlement Agreement
of these parties. That fact does not disturb the Settlement Agreement respecting the 1995 and
1996 consolidated valuation cases.
Finally, as emphasized earlier, the facts extant before the Utah State Tax Commission
are distinguishable from the facts here. With due deference to the Utah State Tax Commission,
this Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Granite School District was a necessary party to
the Settlement Agreement for a number of reasons, the chief of which was that it was
inadequately briefed and argued before this Court. To automatically force this Court to reject the
Settlement Agreement on that ground seems legally impermissible to this Court. But then the
appellate courts will instruct us whether the Tax Court view or the Tax Commission view
constitutes reversible error.
DECISION
It is the opinion of this Court that these parties entered into a legal, enforceable,
constitutionally sanctioned Settlement Agreement to resolve and settle their differences for all
cases involving property tax disputes from 1995 to and including 1999. The Settlement
Agreement was entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to Alliant The
intent to settle is unequivocal.
-24-
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Clearly, the Utah State Tax Commission has jurisdiction over some cases and this Court
has jurisdiction over others. The Court recognizes divisibility of jurisdiction between the Court
and the Utah State Tax Commission.
The rejection of the Settlement Agreement by the Utah State Tax Commission does not
exclude this Court from conducting a careful analysis of all legal issues. An automatic rejection is
not permissible by this Court.
While this Court accepts the divisibility of jurisdiction, it is of the opinion that the
refund amount of $5 million is indivisible and non-allocatable between the various tax years.
Therefore, even though this Court disagrees with the legal theory relied upon by the Utah State
Tax Commission, the Court has no option but to reluctantly disapprove of the Settlement
Agreement. The separately recognized divisibility of jurisdiction does not direct this Court,
legally, to adopt a divisibility of the global refund. The rejection decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission forces this Court to reject a Settlement Agreement which it believes is valid and
legally sustainable. As mentioned earlier, these disparate decisions are on a collision course which
can best be resolved by Utah's appellate courts.
Counsel for plaintiff is instructed to submit an affidavit in support of attorneys' fees and
to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order consistent with this decision.
Plaintiffs filing of the Joint Motion to Approve Settlement delayed this Court's ruling
on:
Alliant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
Tax Commission's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and
Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss (joined by the Salt Lake County
Assessor, Salt Lake county Commission and Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization)
The Court must now turn its attention back to these motions.
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The Clerk of the Court is instructed to schedule a status conference call with the various
Dated this £&

day of September, 2001.
BYTHE^OURT

, JUDGE
Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq.
Maxwell A. Miller, Esq.
John McCarry, Esq.
Michelle Snow, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
J. Craig Smith, Esq.
Kelly Wright, Esq.
John E. S. Robson, Esq.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 17-53-315
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 17. COUNTIES
CHAPTER 53. COUNTY EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE BODY, AND OTHER OFFICERS
PART 3. COUNTY EXECUTIVE
1 7 - 5 3 - 3 1 5 Actions —Control and direction.

(1) (a) A county executive may control and direct the prosecution, defense, and settlement of all
lawsuits and other actions:
(i) to which the county is a party;
(ii) as to which the county may be required to pay the judgment or the costs of prosecution
or defense; or
(Hi) as further provided by county ordinance.
(b) If necessary, the county executive may, upon the recommendation of the county or district
attorney or if required by court order, employ counsel to represent the county in the lawsuit or
other action or assist the county attorney or, in a county that does not have a county attorney,
the district attorney in conducting those lawsuits or any other actions where the county attorney
or district attorney, as the case may be, is authorized by law to act.
(2) If a lawsuit or other action is brought or prosecuted by another elected official or a board or other
entity of the county under a statutory duty, that other elected official, board, or other entity may
control and direct the lawsuit or other action, consistent with applicable law.

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L 1907, § 5 1 1 , subd. 8; C.L 1917, § 1400x8; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-24;
L 1971, ch. 24, § 1 ; C. 1953, 17-5-24; renumbered by L 1994, ch. 147, § 23; C. 1953, 17-5-219;
renumbered by L 2000, ch. 133, § 150 as § 17-53-314; recompiled as § 17-53-315; L 2001, ch. 2 4 1 ,
§74.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Amendment Notes. —The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, renumbered this section, which
'ormerly appeared as § 17-5-219, added "or in a county that does not have a county attorney, the
district attorney," and made related and stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection ( l ) ( a ) substituted the end of the
ntroductory paragraph beginning with "defense" for "and defense of all actions"; added Subsections
l)(a)(ii) and ( l ) ( a ) ( i i i ) ; in Subsection ( l ) ( b ) added the phrases "upon the recommendation of the
:ounty or district attorney or if required by court order" and "to represent the county in the lawsuit or
)ther action"; added Subsection (2); and made stylistic changes.
:ompiler's Notes. —This section was recompiled by the Office of Legislative Research and General
:ounsel from § 17-53-314 to accomodate the recompilation by that office of a provision enacted by
nother chapter consistent with the renumbering of the other provisions of this title by Laws 2000, ch.
33.
OTES TO DECISIONS

NALYSIS
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Attorney-client relationship.
Fees for defending indigents.
Attorney-client relationship.
Since this section merely states the necessary effect of the basic relationship between the county
commission and the county attorney, that the attorney acts under the direction of the commission, and
since the duties that may be specified under § 17-18-1.5(6)(c) are consistent with the basic scheme of
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13, the county attorney has an attorney-client relationship only with the
county as an entity, not with the commission or the individual commissioners. Salt Lake County
Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Att'y, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899.
Only when the county attorney determines that there is a potential for a violation of law is he given
certain limited remedies available to a private attorney. Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County
Att'y, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899.
Fees for defending indigents.
This section does not authorize county commissioners or the district court to incur liability against the
county for attorney's fees in defending an indigent person charged with crime. Pardee v. Salt Lake
County, 39 Utah 482, 118 P. 122, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 200 (1911).
U.C.A. 1953 § 17-53-315, UT ST § 17-53-315
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003
(Federal Cases).
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. (C) West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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U.C.A. 1953 § 59-1-601
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 59. REVENUE AND TAXATION
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL TAXATION POLICIES
PART 6. JUDICIAL REVIEW
5 9 - 1 - 6 0 1 District court jurisdiction.

(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63-46b-15, beginning July 1, 1994, the district
court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the commission after that
date resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent proceeding, and does not
mean a trial de novo on the record.
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken after January 1, 1997,
the commission shall certify a record of its proceedings to the district court.
(b) This Subsection (3) supersedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to judicial review of formal
adjudicative proceedings.

History: C. 1953, 59-24-1, enacted by L 1977, ch. 80, § 20; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 3, § 36;
1987, ch. 161, § 215; 1992, ch. 127, § 2; 1993, ch. 248, § 2; 1997, ch. 309, § 2.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Amendment Notes. —The 1997 amendment, effective January 1, 1997, divided Subsection (3)
adding the Subsection (3)(a) and (3)(b) designations; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted "January 1,
1997" for "July 1, 1994," deleted "which record shall be reviewed and considered by the district court"
at the end of the first sentence, and deleted the second and third sentences concerning consideration
of new witnesses and evidence; and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. —Laws 1998, ch. 326, § 1 amended this section; § 5 of the same act provided that
if during the 1998 general election, the electors of the state approve the amendment to Utah Const.,
Art. X I I I , Sec. 11 proposed by L. 1998, S.J.R. 13, Resolution on Review of Tax Commission Cases,
effective on January 1, 1999, the 1998 amendment to this section is repealed and the section as last
amended in 1997 is reinstated. The amendment was approved and the 1997 version of this section
reinstated. This section, as last amended in 1997, has retrospective operation to July 1, 1994, for
decisions relating to revenue and taxation that are issued by the State Tax Commission or a county
board of equalization, for which the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or a district court has not
issued a final unappealable judgment or order, and for which retrospective application does not
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy a vested right.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Retroactive application.
Timeliness of filing.
Zonstitutionality.

Ui di s
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This section, which purports to grant the district court jurisdiction to review by trial de novo final
decisions of the state tax commission resulting from formal hearings, was unconstitutional under Utah
Const., Art. X I I I , Sec. 11 and Art. V, Sec. 1. (Decision prior to amendment to Utah Const., Art. X I I I ,
Sec. 11.) Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm%nf 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997).
Retroactive application.
This section applied retroactively to authorize the district court to review a dispute arising before the
effective date of the section; however, dismissal was upheld as section was ruled unconstitutional.
(Decision prior to amendment to Utah Const., Art. X I I I , Sec. 11.) Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997).
Timeliness of filing.
Untimely filing of petition for judicial review of Tax Commission order that was unambiguously the last
final agency action in the case deprived court of jurisdiction. Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n,

2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17.
The court of appeals appropriately granted plaintiff an "equitable exception" to the filing requirement
because plaintiffs petition for review of a tax commission decision was pending when Utah Supreme
Court opinon Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah
1997), was issued that held that the 1993 amendment to § 59-1-601 violated the Utah Constitution.
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 1 1 , 20 P.3d 287.

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-1-601, UT ST § 59-1-601
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003
(Federal Cases).
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. (C) West 2004 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

4C1
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.,

RULING RESPECTING THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF BLUTH V. UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION (BLUTH
H) ON THIS COURT'S DECISIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 990402607
DATE: MAY 20,2003

SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN,
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,

V

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS
PTFRKSGT
v_^l_vJ_vlv£v.. OvJJ

Defendants,
vs.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

j

Defendants-Intervenors. ;

In this Court's Ruling on Various Pending Objections and Requests dated December 10,
2002, this Court noted:
Various parties have referenced the recent Utah Supreme Court case of
Bluth v State Tax Commission, 2002 Ut 91. It has been relied upon in early
briefing. Because of its reversal by the Utah Supreme Court, additional
briefing is dictated as to the pending Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial
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Summary Judgment and Motion for Summary Judgment, Also, since briefing
and argument on these motions, the Settlement Agreement, which the Court
has validated, included the plaintiffs NIROP complaint for 1995-1999.
This Court does not wish to entertain any further oral argument, but it
does invite short, concise briefing on how these developments potentially
affect the outcome of the pending motions. Alliant is invited to first
commence briefing.
This Court has previously approved the submitted Findings/Conclusions subject to
changes noted on pages 5 and 6 of the ruling. Counsel were instructed "to reduce the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to one pleading, if possible, or if necessary, two pleadings if the
NIROP action is carved out." Accordingly, the invitation to comment on Bluth and to
consolidate the pleadings was not an invitation to further tinker with the language approved by
the Court in its previous ruling.
I.
RECENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Since the invitation to participate in additional briefing, this Court has received the
following pleadings, documents and correspondence:
DOCUMENT OR PLEADING

L D A T E FILED

PARTY

]

December 26, 2002

Defendants' Objection to Proposed Findings of Defendants, except for
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision
Salt Lake County
(NIROP)
Board of Equalization

December 23, 2002

Letter

From Maxwell A.
Miller, Eteq., Alliant
Techsystems, Inc.

January 2,2003

Letter

J. Craig Smith, Esq.,
Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization

January 13,2003

Supplemental Memorandum on Bluth v. Utah
State Tax Commission

Alliant Techsystems,
Inc.
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January 30, 2003

Utah State Tax Commission's Supplemental
Memorandum on Bluth v. Utah State Tax
Commission

Utah State Tax
Commission

January 31, 2003

Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum on
Bluth v. Utah State Tax Commission

Defendants, except for
Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization

February 5, 2003

Letter

Maxwell A. Miller,
Esq., Alliant
Techsystems, Inc.

February 7, 2003

Notice to Submit

Alliant Techsystems,
Inc.

March 18, 2003

Letter

Alliant Techsystems,
Inc.

In addition, the Court has received copies of a series of emails exchanged between
counsel bearing dates of December 16, 17, 18, 19, 2002. These have not been entered into the
file. Generally these emails deal with the order/caption concern raised by the Court in the
December 10, 2002 Ruling.
II.
DISCUSSION
This Court has carefully reviewed the briefs from the parties regarding Bluth. This
Court, in a Memorandum Decision dated November 7,2002, interpreted Bluth in a pending tax
court case; Monson v. Utah State Tax Commission (Fourth District Court, Case No. 010402468).
This Court ruled then, and reaffirms here, that Bluth is a very fact sensitive, fact intensive case
which must be interpreted and applied very narrowly. The decision was based upon the
application the Administrative Rulemaking Act, not the Administrative Procedures Act. No
administrative rule is challenged here. The Utah Supreme Court could have announced the
decision with more sweeping and broad language, but it did not.
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Accordingly, this Court now re-emphasizes its analysis of Bluth II consistent with the
Monson decision.1
This court has specifically and repeatedly rejected defendants' arguments that this Court
lacks jurisdiction. That argument is again repeated in light of Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
2002 UT 91 (hereafter Bluth II). This Court's decision in Monson most closely parallels the
analysis of Alliant Techsystems, Inc. found in its supplement memorandum. This Court adopts, in
large measure, that succinct position. The specific issue in Bluth II as articulated by the Supreme
Court, is "whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge to a rule
promulgated by the Utah State Tax Commission." 2002 UT 91 at \ 1 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court concluded the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a challenge
because Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12 of the Administrative Rulemaking Act "requires exhaustion
as a prerequisite to judicial review of a Commission rule," Id. at \ 7 (emphasis added). By its
express language, the Supreme Court's Bluth II decision is limited to what constitutes the
"irreparable harm exception" to exhaustion under the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Bluth II
did not arise under, nor does it have application to, the Administrative Procedures Act.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Bluth II is manifestly narrower than the Court of
Appeals' decision in the same case, which the Supreme Court reversed. Specifically, the Court of
Appeals had framed the issue as a "declaratory judgment action challenging the Commission's
very authority to act in this matter." Bluth v Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT App 138, ^f 7 (copy
attached) ("Bluth I"). Under the Court of Appeals' framing of the issue, any declaratory
judgment action against the Tax Commission for alleged "illegal" actions can be brought in
District Court. The Supreme Court decided the case in a very limited context; whether

x

Upon request the Court will send counsel a copy of the Monson v. Utah State Tax
Commission ruling.
-4-
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exhaustion of administrative remedies was a statutory prerequisite to a District Court challenge of
a Tax Commission rule under the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
The distinction between the framing of the issue in Bluth I and Bluth II is important
because Bluth II applies solely to a construction of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Given its
broader framing of the issue, the Court of Appeals cited several cases holding, '"a plaintiff is not
generally required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for
declaratory relief.' Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 12, P4, 974 P.2d 286; see
also Brumlev v State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
Taylor. 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (1964) ('The [exhaustion requirement] does not apply
when.. .the administrative officer of body [] acts without the scope of.. .its defined statutory
authority.')." Id. at % 7.
Significantly, Bluth II did not overrule any of the cases Bluth I relied upon, but simply
found them inapplicable. These cases remain viable law. Because the issue in Bluth II involved
only "challenges [to] the Commission's application of its own rules," "Brumlev and related case
law does not support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed
[within the meaning of the Administrative Rulemaking Act] if required to exhaust their
administrative remedies." 2002 UT 91 \ 17.
In support of its Bluth II decision, the Supreme Court cites Nebeker v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 2001 UT 74 for the general proposition that "requiring exhaustion is appropriate
because it would give the Commission the opportunity to address plaintiffs' constitutional claims
[in Nebeker]"). Id. at % 17 (summarizing Nebeker at % 16-17). In Bluth II footnote 4, the Court
further explains Nebeker: "The mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate the
need for exhaustion of administrative remedies because the Commission's decision in the
administrative proceeding could avoid and moot the constitutional issue." Id. at n. 4. Logically,
the obverse must also be true; legal issues that cannot be mooted or avoided are appropriately
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brought in an original proceeding before the District Court because they are the sole issues at
stake or the Tax Commission lacks jurisdiction to decide them.
Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the NIROP action does not challenge any
Tax Commission rule under the Administrative Rulemaking Act, as did the Bluth plaintiffs. For
that reason, Alliant's NIROP action and the Supreme Court holding in Bluth IL by its express
language, are not analogous to the instant case.
Equally significant, Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the NIROP action,
unlike the Nebeker action, seeks relief solely upon constitutional and related grounds the Tax
Commission has no jurisdiction to decide. These are issues which no conceivable Tax
Commission ruling could moot. In the NIROP action, Alliant seeks:
1.

An order declaring that Defendants, and each of them, acting under color of state
law, have . . . imposed an unconstitutional tax upon Plaintiff in violation of Article
VI of the United States Constitution, and have violated 42 U.S.C § 1988; [and];

2.

A preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants enjoining them from
further issuing unlawful and unconstitutional assessments; and a preliminary and
permanent injunction against Defendant Richardson enjoining him from collecting
unlawfully assessed taxes;

Amended Complaint at 23, 24.
Whatever the Tax Commission ruled in the 1995-1999 valuation cases, or could rule in
the 2000 valuation case, on Alliant's claim that County taxation of NIROP violates state law, the
federal law claims (specifically including the civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and
the claim for injunctive relief on prospective years remain unadjudicated. Neither of these claims
challenges the Tax Commission's promulgation of a rule under the Administrative Rulemaking
Act. Bluth IPs exhaustion requirement is, accordingly, inapplicable to the NIROP action. The
Utah cases the Court of Appeals cited, as well as others that permit direct challenges to unlawful
taxation, remain applicable law. See, e.g.. State Tax Comm'n v. Wright 596 P.2d 634 (Utah
1979) (constitutionality or legality of the tax statutes may be raised as issues in an action in
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district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-2-301 (action to recover illegal tax) and Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-1326 (injunction to restrain illegal collection)).
BLUTH IPS HOLDING ON EXHAUSTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO
DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE NIROP ACTION.
The Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss claims Alliant's "original action contravenes
the plain language of the Utah Constitution requiring that this action be brought first before the
Commission." Tax Commission Motion to Dismiss at 1. Alliant's response emphasizes, "the Tax
Commission is not legally competent and has no jurisdiction to address the federal constitutional
issues [present in NIROP], the Section 1983 issues, nor the injunction or refund issues and
properly declined to do so." Alliant Memorandum in Reply to Tax Commission Motion to
Dismiss at 4. Bluth II and Nebeker conclusively reinforce Alliant's argument. Following
Nebeker, it would be completely senseless, indeed impossible, to require exhaustion of the federal
constitutional-1983 issue in NIROP when the Tax Commission has no jurisdiction to decide it.
Whatever exhaustion may arguably have been required of Alliant in 1999 when it filed
its NIROP suit no longer pertains. Since 1999, the Tax Commission has ruled in each of the five
years, from 1995 to 1999 inclusive, the County lawfully imposed a privilege tax upon Alliant
because, the Tax Commission apparently thought, Alliant's use of federal property was
"exclusive" (provided one does not count the Navy's supervision and control as "use"). The fact
remains the Tax Commission never purported to decide, and indeed cannot resolve, the federal
constitutional issue Alliant has raised in the NIROP action. The constitutional question Alliant
raised in NIROP remains unresolved despite Alliant's reservation of the issue in each of the Tax
Commission proceedings since 1995.
The County's Motion to Dismiss the NIROP action is premised upon the argument that
"The Tax Commission's Final Decision is res judicata on the independent proceeding," meaning
that the Court must enforce the Tax Commission ruling on NIROP and dismiss Alliant's
Complaint. (County Reply to Plaintiffs Response to the County's Supplemental Memorandum in
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Support of Motion to Dismiss, May 30,2000, p. 2.) To the contrary, the plain language of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1), provides that appeals from the Tax Commission to the District Court
are by "trial de novo," statutorily defined as "an original, independent proceeding." More relevant
here, Bluth II and Nebeker reaffirm the concept that exhaustion is not required when the Tax
Commission cannot resolve, and therefore cannot moot, federal constitutional claims (Section
1983 claims) and claims for injunctive relief, as are present in the NIROP action.
BLUTH IFS HOLDING ON EXHAUSTION IS INAPPLICABLE TO
DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS TO STRIKE.
The Tax Commission and other defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of
Kim Abplanalp and Lt. Commander Robert Kauffman on various grounds the parties have
extensively briefed. Likewise, Alliant filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Robert Sumsion
and Ed Kent, on various grounds that were also extensively briefed. The parties' respective
memoranda on these motions do not expressly argue the jurisdictional issues in Bluth II and
Nebeker. Since this Court has already ruled it has jurisdiction in the NIROP action, the
admissibility of the respective affidavits must be resolved on the merits, and not on any applicable
directive from Bluth II.
Bluth II and Nebeker do shed light on why the Tax Commission's jurisdictional
arguments in the NIROP action are without merit. The Tax Commission's Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 1,2000, disputes portions of the
Affidavits of Kim Abplanalp and Lt. Commander Robert Kaufman. Tax Commission
Memorandum in Opposition to Alliant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-7.
Simultaneously, yet contrariwise, the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment claims
"there are no genuine issues as to the material facts relating to [Alliant's] claims." Tax Comm'n
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2.
The legality of taxing Alliant for its use of NIROP property is pending before this Court
and the Tax Commission for the year 2000. On the one hand, the Tax Commission should be an
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impartial adjudicator of issues before it. Yet on the other hand, the Tax Commission chose to
intervene as a party defendant in the NIROP action to "contest" proposed facts in the affidavits
Alliant submitted. Since then, the Tax Commission has continuously fought against Alliant in the
NIROP action.
The incompatibility of the Tax Commission as "impartial adjudicator" and simultaneous
"advocate" is obvious. Said this Court, "A contestation of the facts by the Utah State Tax
Commission may cross the line into an advocacy role, may suggest partiality of the State Tax
Commission, and would hopelessly weaken or destroy its jurisdictional arguments based upon an
exhaustion of administrative remedies theory." Tax Court Ruling (Sept. 7, 2001), p. 6. Under
Brumley, as reaffirmed in Bluth IL legal questions, which the Tax Commission cannot answer (or
should not answer because the Tax Commission has chosen to compromise its roles), must be
resolved in District Court.
DECISION
This Court's ruling that it has jurisdiction in the NIROP action is consistent with Bluth
II and Nebeker. This Court, based upon the above analysis, rejects defendants' view that Bluth II
divests this Court of jurisdiction.
Counsel for Alliant Techsystems, Inc. is instructed to prepare an order consistent with
this decision.
Dated this ?& day of May, 2003.
BY THE COURT
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cc:

Randy Grimshaw, Esq.
Maxwell Miller, Esq.
Michelle Bush, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
John E S Robson, Esq.
Kelly Wright, Esq.
J Craig Smith, Esq.
David Pearce, Esq.
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMA B. SP^ITH, Clerk
^k^__Peputy
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLIANT TECHS YSTEMS, INC.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 990402607
DATE: JUNE 3,2002
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, LEE GARDNER in
his official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR; LARRY RICHARDSON in his
official capacity as SALT LAKE COUNTY
TREASURER; MARY CALLAGHAN,
RANDY HORIUCHI, and BRENT
OVERSON, in their official capacities as the
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, and
the SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,

CLERK: SGJ

Defendants,
vs.

!

THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
and GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants-Intervenors.

This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on January 29,2002. The parties
vere present and represented as follows:
Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

Maxwell Miller, Esq.
Randy Grimshaw, Esq.
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Salt Lake County Assessor
Utah State Tax Commission

Kelly Wright, Esq.
Michelle Bush, Esq.

Salt Lake County & Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization

Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.

Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization

Craig Smith, Esq.
Brett Rich, Esq.

Granite School District, Intervenor

David Pearce, Esq.

Arguments were entertained and the matter was taken under advisement. Counsel were
advised that the written decision would be delayed because the issues are complex and unique, the
briefing is extensive, and the Court does not have the benefit of a law clerk. In addition, the
Court is handling over a hundred cases in the Municipal Division assignment on many days and
occasionally two hundred to three hundred cases per day. Attempting to find contemplative time
to consider the profound arguments of counsel in a case of this importance and magnitude is
mind-boggling.
The various motions will be treated separately because some have unique facts and
procedure. It is important also to note that the date stamping of motions, memoranda, responses
and replies is a bit tricky because in many instances faxed copies were entered, and upon arrival
originals were again entered by a clerk of the court. In addition, some briefing addresses
overlapping and intertwining issues. The Court will treat the pending motions in the following
order:
1. Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider
Its Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement;
2. Acceptance, modification of, or rejection of Plaintiff s Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement;
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3. Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision and
consideration of Plaintiff s [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement; and
4. The Award of Attorneys' Fees.
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and briefing of the parties, the Court now
enters the following:

I.
MOTION
SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S MOTION ASKING THE COURT T O
RECONSIDER ITS DECISION THAT THE ASSESSOR WAS A PARTY
TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A, Procedural History
1. On September 20,2001, this Court issued its "Tax Court Decision," in which it held
the language of the Settlement Agreement, "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys" included
the County Assessor as a County officer and, therefore, a party.
2. Salt Lake County Assessor filed this motion and supporting memorandum on
October 29,2001, requesting reconsideration of this portion of the decision.
3. Within the motion and memorandum, the Salt Lake County Assessor also objects to
an award of attorney fees. (This objection will be addressed separately under Section IV of this
opinion.)
4. Plaintiff responded by filing "Plaintiffs Response to (1) Defendants' Objections to
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement; and (2) Assessor's Memorandum for Reconsideration." (Response 1 will be addressed
n Section II of this opinion.)
-3-
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5- On December 21,2001, the Utah State Tax Commission filed a Memorandum in
Reply to Alliant's Motion to Alter OR Amend Tax Court Decision and In Reply to Salt Lake
County Assessor's Motion to Reconsider. (Thefirstpart of the brief will be discussed in Section
III of this opinion.)
6. Alliant filed an opposing memorandum on October 31,2001.
7. On January 17,2002, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant") responded to
a. Tax Commission's Memorandum in Reply to Alliant's Motion to
Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision ("Tax Commission Memorandum");
b. Salt Lake County Assessor's Memorandum in Support of His Motion
to Amend OR Dismiss Alliant's First Claim for Relief ("Assessor
Memorandum");
c. Granite's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend
Tax Court Decision ("Granite Memorandum"); and
d. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's Memorandum Opposing
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision ("County
Memorandum"). Many of these responses will be addressed in other sections
of this opinion, but there are arguments intertwined dealing with the
Assessor's Motion to Reconsider.
8. On November 28,2001, the Salt Lake County Assessor filed a "Notice to Submit for
Decision.

B. What Is This Court Reconsidering?
This Court, in its September 20,2001, "Tax Court Decision," on pages 14-15, under
Sub-Section C (Is the Settlement Agreement Defeated by Salt Lake County Assessor's Claim that
He is Not a Party to the Settlement Agreement?), ruled as follows:
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Prior to the adoption of the Settlement Agreement, a draft or proposal
was circulated that clearly indicated Salt Lake County, "Assessors," etc., as
the parties to the action. The "assessors" language was stricken out The
Settlement Agreement which was agreed to indicates "Salt Lake County, its
officers," etc.
That agreement/letter, agreed to and adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake
County Commission bears the signature of Karl Hendriksen, Deputy District
Attorney. It was an offer of settlement presented by the attorney/agent of the
parties. No one can contend that the duly elected Salt Lake County Assessor
is not an officer of Salt Lake County. He is. He is a nominal party to the
Settlement Agreement,
This Court appreciates the unique duties and role of a county assessor.
A county assessor has statutory charges whichfrequentlyplace him/her at
odds with the decisions of a board of equalization. The assessor necessarily
"checks" the decisions of the board and the assessor may appeal decisions Qf
the Board of Equalization on various grounds. Nonetheless, the Court finds
that the Salt Lake County Assessor, as an officer of Salt Lake County, is an
nominal party to the settlement agreement. The Salt Lake County
Commission has authority to legally bind the County and its officers.

C« County Assessor Legal Arguments
The Assessor specifically requests that this Court reconsider the above ruling and the
concomitant award of attorneys' fees against the Assessor. At earlier stages the Assessor did not
iddress the issue of attorneys' fees because of his constant and steadfast claim that he was not a
Darty to the Settlement Agreement. In making a Motion to Reconsider, the Assessor relies
generally upon the holding of Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields. 882 P. 2d 650 (Utah 1994) citing
3ennion v. Hansen, 699 P. 2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985), which state that "(I)t is settled law that a
rial court isfreeto reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of afinalorder or judgment."
Jince nofinalctrder or judgment has entered, the Motion Asking the Court to Reconsider Its
)ecision is procedurally authorized.
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The County Assessor argues that he is an independently elected county official with
unique statutory and constitutional duties and that the County Commission had no authority to
bind the Assessor. Secondly, the Assessor argues that the Settlement was void as contrary to
public policy and constitutional and statutory mandates. Next, the Assessor argues that the
Settlement Agreement was an unlawful attempt to bind a future legislative body, and that the
Settlement Agreement violates the Utah Constitution and state statutes.
At oral argument, counsel argues that the Assessor cannot be bound by the Settlement
Agreement as a matter of contract law because there was no meeting of the minds, no bargain for
exchange and no offer and acceptance. The Salt Lake County Assessor was not privy to the offer
from Alliant to the Board of Equalization in November of 2000. Further, the counter offer made
in December 5, 2000, made by the Board of Equalization back to Alliant specifically struck
"assessors," but included Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys.
The Utah State Tax Commission argues that the Salt Lake County Assessor is an
independently elected official, independent from the Board of Equalization and with constitutional
and statutory duties to assess property both uniformly and at fair-market value. The State Tax
Commission submits that this Court ought to be wary of approving any procedure that allows
these duties and rights to be easily circumvented.
Alliant argues that the arguments made in the Motion to Reconsider simply rehash
those previously "made, debated, considered and rejected." Alliant further argues that a motion
to reconsider is not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that Utah Cdurts
have "consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration of a trial court's order or judgment." See Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields. 882 P. 2d
650,653 n.4 (1994).
Further, Alliant reiterates arguments made previously that a county commission has
authority to bind the Assessor in property tax disputes, and that the Settlement Agreement is
supported by public policy. In addition, Alliant argues that the Settlement Agreement does not
-6-
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bind a future legislative body in performing a legislative function, but binds a government to
honor its contract and live up to its word. AUiant points out again that "breaching contracts made
in settlement of litigation is not a governmental function" and again challenges defendants "to Find
a single case in American Jurisprudence holding that a government entity may breach a settlement
agreement of an unliquidated claim in the absence offraudor overreaching."
D. Court's Discussion
If this Court reads Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P. 2d 650 (Utah 1994) correctly, a
court is free to entertain a motion for reconsideration at any point prior to entry of final order for
judgment. Here, as in Shepherd, no final order or judgment has entered. In the opinion of this
Court, here, as in Shepherd, the motion for reconsideration is, in essence, simply re-argument of
opposition to the previous motion.
This Court is acquainted with cases where a motion to reconsider has been brought
where a relied upon controlling case is no longer good law because of an intervening Supreme
Court decision. Likewise, a court may misstate something or prepare a ruling obvious to all
parties is in error. That is not the case here. The defendants again try to convince the Court that
the Assessor is not a county officer and again attempt to educate the Court as to the unique
constitutional and statutory duties of the assessor. The Court is profoundly aware of those duties.
While it does no harm to revisit these issues, it does no good either if already thoroughly briefed,
argued by counsel and thoroughly considered previously by this Court.

E. Decision on Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion Asking, the Court to Reconsider
Its Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement
It is the opinion of this Court that a party bringing a motion to reconsider has the
burden to demonstrate that the Court ought to modify its decision prior to entry of an order or
ludgment in light of an intervening appellate court decision, newly discovered pertinent facts not
-7U

previously available, newly discovered case law which is on point and potentially dispositive,
because of obvious error, or other substantive reasons not tantamount to simple re-argument.
The Court has accepted the invitation to carefully reconsider and finds that the Assessor has failed
to meet this burden. Accordingly, Salt Lake County Assessor's Motion to Reconsider Its
Decision That the Assessor Was a Party to the Settlement Agreement is hereby denied.
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n.
CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON JOINT MOTION
TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT
A. Procedural History
L This Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" on September 20, 2001, with
respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Settlement.
2. On page 25 of the opinion, counsel for plaintiff was instructed to prepare Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order consistent with the decision.
3. Counsel fox AUiant prepared the pleading and submitted it to the Court for signature
on or about October 1,2001.
4. Granite filed an Objection to Allianf s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on October 24,2001.
Granite revised the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by
AUiant to correct the paragraphs to which Granite objects and to add those findings which were
omitted by AUiant. A copy of a red-lined version of Allianf s proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was attached. A copy of afinalFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
encompassing Granite's objections and proposed changes was also attached.
5. Salt Lake County Board of Equalizationfiledits Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and
Request for Hearing on October 25,2001.
6. On October 29,2001, Salt Lake County Assessor filed its Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.
7. On November 2,2001, AUiant filed its Reply to Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization's Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
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on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and Request for Hearing. This Reply addresses
attorneys' fees exclusively and will be considered more fully in Section IV.
8. On November 2,2001, Alliant filed a general/collective Response to Defendants'
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to
Approve Settlement.
9. Alliant filed a Notice to Submit Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order for Decision on November 2,2001.

B. Succinct Statement of Defendant Objections
While a consideration of each objection is laborious and time consuming, attention to
detail in this case is imperative and fly-specking, unfortunately is merited.
1.

Granite School District
i.

ii.

Findings of Fact Objections
(1)

Substitute "shall11 for "are committed" in paragraph 15.

(2)

Paragraph 23 should be removed in its entirety,

Conclusions of Law
(1)

Granite objects to paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 because the Decision was not
limited in time to September 20,2001. The proposed Conclusions of
Law should eliminate any reference to the September 20, 2001 date.

(2)

Granite objects to paragraph 8. While the substance is accurate, it is
not supported by the cite.

(3)

Granite objects to paragraph 9 because it needs clarification. Granite
suggests substitution of the following language: "This Court is not
bound by the Tax Commission's reasoning in reaching its decision of
rejection of the Settlement Agreement because Granite was not an
intervenor in the action before this Court."
-10-
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iii.

Order
(1)

The proposed Order should eliminate any reference to the September
20,2001 date.

2.

Supplementation - Granite suggests that Alliant has ignored and omitted relevant
findings and proposes the inclusion of the following paragraphs:
"Because of the collateral decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission the Settlement Agreement must be defeated on its
face: the Utah State Tax Commission's decision is dispositive
because the "conditional language" of the agreement [is] plain and
clear." Tax Court Decision at 17.
"The issue of divisibility/severability has not been addressed in
the Settlement Agreement and bifurcation is impossible. The
Settlement Agreement presents a single integrated resolution for
five tax years and cannot be bifurcated between two forums with
differing jurisdictions." Id. Accordingly, this Court has no
authority or jurisdiction to approve the settlement for years 1997,
1998, and 1999." M a t 24.
"There is no mechanism in the Settlement Agreement to
allocate the $5 million dollar settlement amount to separate years;
allocation would involve arbitrary and capricious decisions and
further, if the tax years are severed, it would result in an assessment
nightmare." Id at 17.
"The Agreement is fundamentally flawed because there is no
attempt to achieve fair market value. Uniformity, fairness and
equality cannot be achieved." Id.

3.

Salt Lake County Board of Equalization Objection
This objection does not suggest specific revisions and simply objects to the
award of any attorney fees and revisits argument why Assessor Gardner is not a
party to the Settlement Agreement. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization takes
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no further exception to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement
4.

Salt Lake County Assessor's Objections
L

Findings of Fact
(1) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 3 because the italicized
language is misleading, factually inaccurate and beyond the
Court's decision.
(2) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 5 because of the pending
Motion to Reconsider.
(3) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 8 - same objection as
paragraph 5.
(4) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 11 because it is a conclusion of
law, not a finding of fact In addition, the County Commission's
authority to settle tax disputes is limited. A
(5) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 13, but "valuations based upon
fair market value" is not addressed in the settlement.
(6) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 17 which is inaccurate as to the
role of the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization.
(7) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 19 as redundant and it should be
stricken.
(8) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 23 as inconsistent with the plain
language of the Settlement Agreement. It should be reconsidered by
the Court and deleted.
(9) Assessor takes exception to paragraph 28 on various grounds.
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ii.

Conclusions of Law - Assessor Objections
(1)

Much of the language in paragraph 2 is not found in the Court's
decision.

(2) The language of paragraph 3 is inconsistent with the Court decision on
page 24.
(3) The "September 20,2001" language of paragraph 4, 5,6 and 7 should
be eliminated and the language of paragraph 7 must be clarified.
(4) Assessor objects to attorney fee provision in paragraph 8 for the
reasons stated in the Motion for Reconsideration.
iii.

Assessor's Objections to Order
Assessor objects to any award of attorney's fees and also adopts by
reference Granite's Objection to Alliant's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.
C. Alliant's Collective Response to Defendant Objections

In pages 4 -11 of its collective response, Alliant addresses each of the objections of
Granite and the Salt Lake County Assessor. Alliant does not respond specifically to the Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization because the Board does not suggest specific revisions and simply
re-argues its positions.
D. Court's Consideration of Objections by Defendants And Alliant's Response
A careful review of the objections and response suggests that the decision could have
been written with greater specificity. Some objections are well taken and proposed language is
more consistent with the decision.
If the Court is accurate, the defendants collectively take exception to the following:
Findings of Fact paragraphs 3, 5, 8,11,13,15, 17,19,23,28;
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Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 2,3,4, 5, 6, 7,8,9; and
Order in its entirety.
E. Ruling as to Defendants' Objections to Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law And Order
L There being no objection, the Court approves paragraphs 1,2, 4, 6, 7, 9,10,12, 14,
16,18,20, 21, 22, 24,25,26, and 27 of the proposed Findings of Fact
2. Paragraph 3 should be clarified stating that "a draft or proposal was circulated that
clearly indicated Salt Lake County, 'Assessors/ etc., as the parties to the action."
3. Paragraphs 5 and 8, 11,13,17 and 19 are approved over objection of Assessor.
4. Paragraph 15, substitute "shall" for "are committed to."
5. Paragraph 23 needs further clarification. Alliant is correct that it is drawn practically
verbatim from the Court's decision. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization refers to paragraph
23 as an "apparent oversight" in a collateral memorandum. Other defendants echo an identical
sentiment. It is not an "apparent oversight," but it is worthy of a revisit. Consider:
The Independent or NIROP Action involves Alliant's challenge to the County's
assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction of the United States Navy
(the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or NIROP). The Complaint in the independent or
NIROP action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the
years 1995,1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and further years. In addition, the Complaint also requests
relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the County for having taxed Alliant in violation of Article VI
of the United States Constitution. The Settlement Agreement expressly covers tax years 19951999, clearly including the NIROP action. But the Settlement Agreement does not cover future
years (beyond the scope of the Settlement Agreement) where Alliant claims continued unlawful
assessment of NIROP. Therefore, portions of NIROP claims are expressly covered by the
Settlement Agreement and portions, future claims, were expressly excepted; never addressed in
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the Settlement Agreement The Settlement Agreement does not bar post-settlement NIROP
claims. The NIROP claims are separatefromthe other related valuation cases.
6. The attorneys' fees provision contained in paragraph 28 will be addressed in Section
IV of this decision.
7. The Court approves paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law because there is no
objection.
8. Over objection of Assessor paragraph 2 is approved.
9. Paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact should be included as a Conclusion of Law and
paragraph 11 of the Findings should be substituted with the following: "This settlement
Agreement was proposed initially by the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and then was
adopted/ratified by the Salt Lake County Commission/1
10. References to September 20,2001 should be deleted in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7.
11. Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions is approved over objection of Assessor.
12. Paragraph 8 of the Conclusions is approved over objection with the addition of a
citation to page 24 of the decision.
13. Paragraph 9 of the Conclusions is approved over objection.
14. Granite argues that the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ignore
and omit relevant findings of the Tax Court. Granite's proposedfindingsare accurately drawn
from the opinion, but are simply this Court's attempt to articulate the defendants' arguments as
the Court understood them. If the parties wish, these paragraphs could be included as a laundry
list of arguments entertained and considered by the Court before reaching its decision.
15. The Order should eliminate any reference to the September 20,2001 date.
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in.
ALLIANTS MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND TAX COURT DECISION AND
CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S [PROPOSED AND REVISED]
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON
JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT'
A. Procedural History
1. This Court entered a written "Tax Court Decision" on September 20,2001, with
respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Approve Settlement.
2. Pursuant to the request of the Court, Alliant submitted Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on October 1,200 L
3. Alliant submitted [Proposed and Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on November 13,2001.
4. Alliant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision together with a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on November 14,
200L
5. Salt Lake County Board of Equalization filed a Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs
Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on December 21,2001.
6. Granite filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend
Tax Court Decision, Objection to Proposed and Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on December 27,200 L
7. The Utah State Tax Commission filed a Memorandum in Reply to Alliant's Motion
to Alter or Amend .. on December 21,2001.
8. The Salt Lake County Assessor filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision, Objection to Proposed and Revised Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve Settlement on November 24,2001.
9. Alliant filed Plaintiffs Response/Reply to: (1) Tax Commission's Memorandum in
Reply to Alliant's Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision; (2) Salt Lake County
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Assessor's Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Amend or Dismiss Alliant's First Claim For
Relief; (3) Granite's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court
Decision; and (4) Salt Lake County Board of Equalization's Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs
Motion to Alter or Amend Tax Court Decision on January 15,2002.
B. Statement of Facts
Granite agrees with Alliant's statement of facts 1-8, and 10-11 and disputes Alliant's
statement #9. Granite also proposes additional facts.
Assessor generally adopts Alliant's statements 1 - 4,6 and 7, and acknowledges that
Alliant's Petition for Review and Complaint for the 1997 through 1999 property tax years has
been assigned to this Tax Court.
The Utah State Tax Commission submitted its own "background" facts but does not
specifically take exception to the Alliant's statement of facts. Likewise, Salt Lake County Board
of Equalization proposed abbreviated facts but did not take specific exception to the facts as
stated by Alliant. Upon review, the Court adopts the following statement of facts:
1. On March 7,2001, the Tax Commission denied Alliant and the County's Joint
Vtotion for Approval of Settlement.
2. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on April 23,2001 through April 27,
£001, to determine the fair market value for the property in question for the years 1997 through
[999. The Tax Commission determined that the fair market value for Alliant's property was
5215,210,000, $212,559,000 and $232,650,000 for the years 1997 through 1999 respectively.
3. On September 21,2001, Alliant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Third
udicial District Court, seeking "review by trial de novo" under Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 of the
"ax Commission's Final Decision in Alliant Techsvstems v. Board of Equalization of Salt Lake
bounty, et aL Appeal Nos. 98-0452,98-0608 and 99-019. These consolidated cases protest the
bounty's assessments of Alliant's real property for the years 1997,1998 and 1999 (the "1997-17iltt/
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1999 Valuation Case"). Under regular administrative procedures, the 1997-1999 Valuation Case
was designated Case No. 010908307 and assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, sitting as
a Tax Court Judge.
4. Judge Ronald E. Nehring disqualified himself from the case by Minute Entry dated
October 9, 2001.
5. The 1997-1999 Valuation Case was thereupon assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian,
sitting as a Tax Court Judge.
6. Filed simultaneously with its Petition for review in the 1997-1999 Valuation Case
was AUiant's Motion to Transfer the case to the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis, a designated
"Tax Court Judge" in the Tax Division of the Utah District Courts.
7. Alliant filed a Motion to Transfer the 1997-1999 Valuation Case to this Court. No
less than six other related cases involving the same parties, properties and taxes are pending
before the Court. Thefirstof the six pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County cases was filed
February 6,1998, and was initially assigned to Judge Dennis Frederick. This first case was
termed the "Independent or NIROP Action," and involves Alliant's statutory and constitutional
challenge to the County's assessment of federal property that Alliant operates under the direction
and control of the United States Navy (the Naval Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant or
"NIROP"). The Complaint in the Independent or NIROP Action seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief against defendant Salt Lake County for the years 1995,1996, 1997,1998, 1999 and future
years. The Complaint also requests relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for having
taxed Alliant in violation of Article Vf of the United States Constitution.
8. There being no opposition, Judge Frederick assigned the Independent or NIROP
Action to a "Tax Court Judge," who, by random rotation, was the Honorable Lynn W. Davis.
9. The other five pending Alliant v. Salt Lake County, et aL cases are appeals that
either Salt Lake County or Alliant filed from a Final Decision the Utah State Tax Commission
("Tax Commission") issued November 16, 1999 on the consolidated appeals of the County's 1995
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and 1996 tax assessments of Alliant's real property (the "1995-1996 Valuation Case"). The Clerk
of the Third Judicial District initially assigned the various appeals of the 1995-1996 Valuation
Case respectively to Judges Nehring, Hanson, Lewis, Medley and Memmott Again with
agreement from all parties, the 1995-19996 Valuation Case was consolidated and reassigned to
the Honorable Lynn W. Davis because he was the assigned "Tax Court Judge" for the
Independent or NIROP Action.
10. By Order dated on November 6,2001, Judge Pat B. Brian transferred the 19971999 Valuation Case to this Court.
1L On December 5,2000, the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and Alliant
entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby all property tax disputes between the parties for
the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive were compromised and settled. On December 6, 2000, the
Salt Lake County Commission, as the County's duly constituted legislative body, adopted and
approved the Settlement Agreement.
12. On September 27,2001, Alliant filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Voluntary
Dismissal of the 1995-1999 personal property tax appeals with the Tax Commission, dismissing
all its pending appeals with the Utah State Tax Commission with respect to personal property tax
assessments from 1995 through 1999 inclusive.
13. As a result of the foregoing actions and events, now pending before this Court are
all cases and controversies that exist between Alliant and Salt Lake County relating to property
tax matters for the years 1995 through 1999 inclusive; to-wit, the Independent or NIROP action,
the 1995-1996 Valuation Case, and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. The personal property tax
natters have been dismissed.
C Discussion
This Court has already opined that the Settlement Agreement is "legal, enforceable and
constitutionally sanctioned." It is a blanket settlement between the parties and is a compromise
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and it was negotiated and entered into in good faith and anticipated a refund of $5 million to
Alliant
Because ofjurisdictional developments since the time of the Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement, this Court now has exclusive jurisdiction over all pending tax disputes between Alliant
and defendants for the years 1995 to 1999 inclusive, specifically including the "NIROP" or
"independent action," the 1995-1996 Valuation Case and the 1997-1999 Valuation Case. It is the
opinion of the Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601, the 1995-1996 Valuation Case and
the 1997-1999 Valuation Case are now before this Court as an "original and independent
proceeding" for review by "trial de novo"
The Court has carefully considered defendants' arguments against the Motion to Amend
or Alter filed by Alliant. The Court believes that Alliant's Reply brief adequately addresses each
of those arguments. The Court so finds in order to achieve the clear intent of the parties to settle
the case. This Court declined to initially adopt the Joint Motion, but jurisdictional challenges have
evaporated. In addition, while this Court opined on the divisibility/indivisibility and nonallocatable tax year arguments of counsel, that issue does not become an insurmountable hurdle
for parties working together in good faith to effectuate a settlement agreement The fact that the
Settlement Agreement was drafted and reviewed by seasoned and experienced tax attorneys on
both sides is noted by this Court.
Public policy favors enforcement of the Settlement Agreement; to refund $5 million to
Alliant Exactly how that will take place is unknown, but the source of the funds is clearly
contractually provided; "either from current cash flows and reserves or from the proceeds of the
judgment Levy."
The Court has treated Alliant's Motion to Amend akin to a Motion to Reconsider in
light of the unique jurisdictional developments in this case and because no final order has entered
from the September 20th decision. This Court "may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order
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of the commission, and shall grant relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in
accordance with its decision, as appropriate." Utah Code Ann. §59-1-604.
D. Decision
Alliant's Motion to Amend or Modify is hereby granted and the Court enforces the
Settlement Agreement in its entirety. This decision avoids weeks, if not months, of trial and
squarely places critical issues before Utah's Appellate Courts.
1. Is the Settlement Agreement entered into by and between Salt Lake County, its
officers and attorneys, and Alliant "legal, enforceable and constitutionally sanctioned?"
2. Is the reference to the approval by the State Tax Commission and the Tax Court a
condition precedent or simply a jurisdictional pre-requisite?
3. Even if it is condition precedent, can the Tax Court reverse or modify "any order of
the Commission" and approve the settlement if it has exclusive jurisdiction?
4. Does the "failure of consideration" argument defeat the Settlement Agreement even
if a party to the Settlement Agreement sought its defeat?
5. Is Alliant's Motion to Alter tantamount to a Motion to Reconsider in light of the
unique jurisdictional developments in this case and because no formal order has entered from the
September 20th decision?
6. If the Salt Lake County Assessor is an independently elected county official with
/ery unique statutory and constitutional duties, does the Salt Lake County Commission have the
mthority to bind the Assessor in a lump-sum settlement agreement?
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IV.
COMPUTATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Lastly, Alliant seeks an award of attorneys' fees against the Salt Lake County Assessor.
Various affidavits have been filed by Maxwell A. Miller, Esq. and Randy M. Grimshaw, Esq.,
attorneys for Alliant Techsystems, Inc. In addition, Alliant supports its claim for fees by an
affidavit of Charles R. Brown, Esq., an attorney who practices with the Salt Lake City law firm of
Clyde, Snow, Sessions and Swenson and who was selected as Distinguished Tax Practitioner of
the Year for 1995-1996 by the Tax Section of the Utah State Bar.
Defendant, Salt Lake County Assessor, and Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
argue the fees are grossly out of proportion for the amount of work done. Mr. Smith, in behalf of
the Board, argues that this case involves two non-evidentiary hearings before the Utah State Tax
Commission and this Court, no witness preparation, and no expert witness preparation. The
Board challenges the summary block billing statements and argues that Alliant has not met its duty
to categorize time and fees, to separate the recoverablefromthe non-recoverable, and to
appropriately apportion fees.
This Court is responsive to the block billing argument and the apportionment of fees
argument. While issues and parties are intertwined, there appears to be no legitimate attempt at
apportionment.
At oral argument Mr. Smith, who argued in behalf of the Board, the ultimate payor, and
the Assessor, conceded that $10,000-$ 15,000 would be reasonable for each hearing.
The Court awards attorneys' fees in the sum of $30,000,findingthat Alliant simply
failed to meet its burden further.
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Alliant Techsystems, Inc. is instructed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law which merge itsfirstproposed Findings and Conclusions together with its [Proposed and
Revised] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement, as discussed above.
Dated this 7 ^ day of June, 2002.

Craig Smith, Esq.
Brett Rich, Esq.
David Pearce, Esq.
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Alliant Techsystems, Inc. filed a motion with this Court seeking to supplement the
record with after-acquired testimony. The Utah State Tax Commission filed its Objection to
Alliant Techsystems' Motion to Supplement Record with After Acquired Testimony. The
memorandum is dated August 20,2001.
Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy Horiuchi,
Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Commission and Salt Lake County Board of Equalization,
hrough their counsel Mary Ellen Sloan and Bill Thomas Peters, filed their Objection to Motion to
Supplement Record with After-Acquired Testimony together with a Motion to Strike and Motion
or Sanctions on August 17,2001.
Plaintiff then filed a Reply to Defendant Utah State Tax Commission's Objection to
'laintiff s Motion to Supplement Record with After-Acquired Testimony, which is dated August

24, 2001. On August 27,2001, defendants, Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry Richardson,
Mary Callaghan, Randy Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County Commission and Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization submitted Defendants' Reply in Support of the Objection to
Supplement the Record, Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Randy M. Grimshaw
Maxwell A. Miller

Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

John McCarry, Assistant Attorney General
Michelle Snow, Assistant Attorney General

Utah State Tax Commission

Bill Thomas Peters
Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy Salt Lake District
Attorney

Salt Lake County, Lee Gardner, Larry
Richardson, Mary Callaghan, Randy
Horiuchi, Brent Overson, Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization, Salt Lake County
Commission at the Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Summary Judgment stage

J. Craig Smith

Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board
of Equalization at the Motion to Approve
Settlement Stage

Kelly Wright

Salt Lake County Assessor

John E. S. Robson

Granite School District

The Court has carefully reviewed the various memoranda of the parties and having been
fully apprised in the premises, now enters the following:
I.
The procedural facts are not disputed in this motion:

1.

The plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on or about August
24,1999.

2.

The motion was accompanied by the affidavits of LCDR Robert E. Kaufman and
Kim Abplanalp.

3.

Defendants Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, et al,
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
with affidavits in opposition to plaintiffs motion on or about September 27, 1999.

4.

Subsequent pleadings were filed by the parties related to the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment including Motions to Strike certain affidavits.

5.

On May 4,2000, the Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in
support were filed with the Court.

6.

On May 4, 2000, the Tax Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support were filed with the Court.

7.

On May 17, 2000, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. filed, inter alia, its reply to Tax
Commission's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Tax
Commission's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment.

8.

On June 1,2000, the Tax Commission filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of
its Motion to Dismiss and its Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment.

9.

On June 6, 2000, the .Court heard argument on defendants' motions and various
motions made by the other parties.

10.

Prior to ruling on the various motions, in December 2000, these parties entered
into a settlement agreement, staying the necessity for the Court to rule on the
underlying motions.

-3;.;,1M~?

11.

Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff filed a Joint Motion to Approve
Settlement and in Reply to the Assessor's Memorandum in Opposition to the
Joint Motion on or about March 1, 2001.

12.

Arguments were entertained on March 13,2001, and the Motion to Supplement
the Record was filed prior to this Court's ruling on the motion.

n.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks to supplement the record with the prior sworn testimony of Mr. Jeff
Foote, a witness who testified before the Utah State Tax Commission on April 23, 2001
respecting non-Alliant permanent employers at NIROP; that Alliant shares possession of NIROP
with the United States Navy and with Lockheed Martin. More particularly, Alliant's position is
set forth as follows:
PARTY

POSITION AND ARGUMENTS

Alliant

Background: Alliant motioned for partial summary judgment
because it argues that it does not have exclusive use of NIROP and
should qualify for the privilege tax exemption.
-POINT ONE: Testimony given under oath, subsequent to
submission of Alliant's Motion for Partial summary Judgment and
Defendant's Motion to Strike, further establishes that Alliant does
not have "exclusive possession of the premises" at NIROP, and is
thus entitled to judgment against defendants as a matter of law on
the Fourth Claim for Relief in its Amended Complaint.
Mr. Foote, President of Alliant Aerospace Propulsion
Company testifies at the Tax Commission hearing on
April 23,2001:
-Alliant's usage of NIROP is at the direction and
control of the Navy
-Lockheed-Martin has "approximately 20 persons"
at NIROP who are "watching over our processes,
our quality," and who buy off or accept the
hardware, once it's completed a step."
-4-

-Lockheed-Martin's access to NIROP is granted
directly by the Navy, not Ailiant, since LockheedMartin is the prime contractor with the Navy and
Ailiant is the subcontractor.
THUS: A) Ailiant does not have "exclusive possession of
the premises" required by UCA 59-4-101(3)(e). B)
Defendants' imposition of a "privilege tax" upon Ailiant
under the rationale that Ailiant has "exclusive possession"
of NIROP distorts the plain meaning of "exclusive
Possession."
Defendants argue that the subject information was available to Ailiant at the time of the
filing of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, that the plaintiff has filed the Motion to
Supplement for purposes of delay and Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bars the
supplement of a hearing transcript of Mr. Foote. Additionally, defendants argue that the motion is
simply untimely. Finally, the State Tax Commission argues that the Commission has not yet ruled
in the case involving Mr. Footes' testimony and that the granting of the motion would usurp the
Commission's decision on its pending matter. The Assessor also argues that any attempt to
include valuation testimony at this point is beyond the scope of settlement. Plaintiff, in its reply
memorandum, persuasively counters each of these arguments except for the "beyond the scope of
settlement'argument.
Should the Court be inclined to grant the motion, the State Tax Commission requests
that "the Court must also allow the opposing parties to file a response to the supplemental facts
and to contest them, interpret them for the Court, and have oral argument." Likewise, the other
defendants, if the motion is granted, "request that they be given an opportunity to address the
substance of Foote's testimony in an additional pleading."
RULING
First of all, it is the opinion of this Court that it would be improper to allow the State
Tax Commission additional time to "contest" the proposed supplemental facts. That is not
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consistent with this Court's understanding of the proper role of the State Tax Commission as a
party to this action, A contestation of the facts by the Utah State Tax Commission may cross the
line into an advocacy role, may suggest partiality of the State Tax Commission, and would
hopelessly weaken or destroy its jurisdictional arguments based upon an exhaustion of
administrative remedies' theory. The Court certainly hopes that the request is simply a poor
choice of words as opposed to evidence of partiality of the Utah State Tax Commission against
Alliant Techsystems, Inc.
It is the fear of this Court that if it were to grant this motion that another intractable and
intolerable delay would result because of the need for additional briefing, deposition/discovery
and oral argument in the case. Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion to Supplement is respectfully
denied.
The Court finds no basis to impose sanctions or award attorneys' fees and Defendants'
Motion for Sanctions is denied. Defendants' Motion to Strike the proposed testimony is granted.
Dated this

/ ~~day of September, 2001.
BY THE COURT

cc:

Randy Grimshaw, Esq.
Maxwell A. Miller, Esq.
John McCarry, Esq.
Michelle Snow, Esq.
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
Mary Ellen Sloan, Esq.
J. Craig Smith, Esq.
Kelly Wright, Esq.
John E. S. Robson, Esq.
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